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We are pleased to bring you a special issue on elder mistreat-ment.  This issue was largely organized by our special issueguest co-editor, Nina Kohn, J.D., Associate Dean for Research
and David M. Levy Professor of Law at the Syracuse University College of Law.
She is a well-published and respected expert in the area of elder law. Ms. Kohn
recruited authors representing many facets of elder mistreatment and she
details the articles and general area in her special issue introduction. You will
have the opportunity to read articles from
the perspective of a physician, judge, prose-
cutor, law professor, and guardian. Each
author brings a unique viewpoint to the
topic in a way that we hope will be useful to
judges as they hear cases about elder mis-
treatment or simply hear cases involving
older adults. 
In addition to the articles that are part of
our special issue, you will also find our usual
features including the President’s Column, Thoughts from Canada, and the
crossword puzzle. As always, we are extremely grateful for these regular con-
tributions and we hope you are enjoying them as much as we are. 
Finally, on our Resource Page we provide information about two new pub-
lications. The first is a new book from the American Bar Association, Enhanc-
ing Justice: Reducing Bias. It surveys the rich research on implicit bias while
focusing on the intersection of implicit bias in the court system. The second
is a new offering from the National Center for State Courts’ Center for Sen-
tencing Initiatives. This time, the Center has produced a brief but well-
researched summary of evidence-based practices for making offenders placed
on probation more successful.—EB 
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited,
original articles, essays, and book reviews.  Court Review
seeks to provide practical, useful information to the work-
ing judges of the United States and Canada.  In each issue,
we hope to provide information that will be of use to
judges in their everyday work, whether in highlighting
new procedures or methods of trial, court, or case man-
agement, providing substantive information regarding an
area of law likely to be encountered by many judges, or by
providing background information (such as psychology or
other social science research) that can be used by judges
in their work.  Guidelines for the submission of manu-
scripts for Court Review are set forth on page 85 of this
issue.  Court Review reserves the right to edit, condense, or
reject material submitted for publication.
Advertising: Court Review accepts advertising for prod-
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In recent times, there has been a marked increase in attackson the independence of the judiciary in democratic soci-eties—Pakistan, Venezuela, Turkey, Canada, and the United
States. These attacks are significantly more damaging when
they emanate from the other branches of government—the leg-
islative and the executive. In response, judges must speak out
to preserve and protect judicial independence, a vital pillar in
the architecture of healthy and vibrant democracy.
The concept of judicial independence can be traced back to
18th century England. At its simplest, it means that the judi-
ciary needs to be separated from the other
branches of government. Courts should not be
subject to improper influence from the other
branches of government or from private and par-
tisan interests. Though not a huge fan of the judi-
ciary, President Andrew Jackson did say that “all
rights secured to the citizens under the Constitu-
tion are worth nothing, and a mere bubble, except
guaranteed to them by an independent and virtu-
ous judiciary.” I particularly enjoy the colorful
phrasing of a 19th century British Prime Minister,
Lord Salisbury: “The judicial salad requires both
legal and political vinegar, but disastrous effects
will follow if due preparation is not observed.”
Justice Neil Gorsuch, the most recent appointment to the
U.S. Supreme Court, asserted during his Senate confirmation
hearing that “[u]nder our Constitution, it is for this body, the
people’s representatives, to make new laws. For the executive to
ensure those laws are faithfully enforced and for neutral and
independent judges to apply the law in people’s disputes.”
When members of the other branches of government label a
judge’s decision “ridiculous,” characterize a judge as “so-
called,” or threaten to defund courts that struck down laws
they found unconstitutional, judicial integrity and indepen-
dence are needlessly harmed.
Accordingly, on April 29, 2017, the Board of Governors of
the American Judges Association, acting in the AJA’s role as the
Voice of the Judiciary®, issued this statement in a news release: 
The late Chief Justice William Rehnquist once said that
criticism of judges and their decisions “is as old as our
Republic” and can be a healthy part of the balance of
power between the branches of government. Today,
however, recent attacks on judges have not only become
unhealthy but threaten to undermine the public’s under-
standing of the role of judges in a democratic society.
In a democratic society, judges will inevitably make rul-
ings that challenge the authority of the other two
branches or that protect the disadvantaged and those
without political power.
Intemperate personal attacks on judges by political lead-
ers are simply wrong. The political leaders of our coun-
try have an obligation to foster public understanding of
the role of courts, even when they disagree with a court’s
ruling.
Judges have historically been reluctant to respond to
unfair attacks. But as far back as Chief Justice
John Marshall, there have been times when
judges have seen the need to speak up. This
is one of those times.
The leaders of the American Judges Associa-
tion will speak out in defense of judges who
are unfairly attacked, and we encourage oth-
ers to do so too. Unfair or unseemly attacks
on individual judges are not merely an attack
on that individual judge—they are an attack
on the institution of the judiciary, an institu-
tion indispensable to our democracy.
All of us should use every opportunity to educate the public
of the role of the judiciary in a democracy—who it is; what it
does; and who the public is and why what it thinks matters.
Schools, service clubs, public forums, and even written judg-
ments are excellent mechanisms to do this “job.” A very effec-
tive initiative employed by at least two Canadian provincial
chief judges was to participate in call-in talk-radio shows. 
It is worth remembering that while both courts and legisla-
tures are entitled to enforce rights, only the courts have the
institutional characteristics that best offer the possibility of
responsiveness to minority concerns in the face of majoritarian
pressures, namely independence. Decisions in specific cases are
made independent of the voters’ electoral judgment. Court
decisions can and will attract controversy—free speech permits
that. What should not be condoned are unwarranted ad
hominem attacks on judges. Education by judges can be a very
effective weapon to blunt these types of attacks.
There is no better way to prepare for such presentations than
to attend judicial education programs like the ones being
offered by the American Judges Association at its annual meet-
ing, September 10-15, 2017, in Cleveland, Ohio. Sessions will
include lectures on judicial independence, procedural fairness,
and pretrial justice for both juveniles and adults. 
You can prepare to educate the public on judicial indepen-
dence. Hope to see you there.
Russell J. Otter
President’s Column
JUDGES HAVE A JOB TO DO
Footnotes
1. [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787 (Can.).  
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As in all other common law jurisdictions, hearsay evi-dence—an out-of-court statement tendered for thetruth of its contents—is presumptively inadmissible in
Canada. In R. v. Khelawon,1 the Supreme Court of Canada
described the rationale for excluding hearsay evidence: 
While no single rationale underlies its historical
development, the central reason for the presumptive
exclusion of hearsay statements is the general inability
to test their reliability. Without the maker of the state-
ment in court, it may be impossible to inquire into that
person’s perception, memory, narration or sincerity. The
statement itself may not be accurately recorded. Mis-
takes, exaggerations or deliberate falsehoods may go
undetected and lead to unjust verdicts. Hence, the rule
against hearsay is intended to enhance the accuracy of
the court’s findings of fact, not impede its truth-seeking
function.2
This general prohibition is, as elsewhere, subject to excep-
tions in Canada (such as, for instance, res gestae, dying decla-
rations, etc.). However, through a series of judgments, the
Supreme Court of Canada has dramatically altered the tradi-
tional common law prohibition. The Supreme Court of Canada
has created what it has described as a “principled approach” to
the admissibility of hearsay evidence. This has opened the
door for the admissibility of such evidence in a broad context.
The Law Reform Commission of Ireland recently considered
the admissibility of hearsay evidence and summarized the
Canadian approach in the following manner:
The stance adopted by the Canadian courts to the
rule against hearsay and its exceptions involves a princi-
ple-based approach, i.e. the judging of cases with respect
to general principles such as “necessity” and “reliability”
rather than precise and pre-existing rules. The effect of
these decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada is that
hearsay evidence is admissible if the evidence meets two
criteria: that the evidence is necessary and reliable; and
that the probative value of the evidence is not out-
weighed by its prejudicial effect. Case law establishes
that the necessity criteria will be satisfied if the hearsay
evidence is reasonably necessary to prove a fact in issue,
the relevant direct evidence is not available, and that evi-
dence of the same quality cannot be obtained from
another source. The rationale for the new approach, as
noted by Lamer CJC in R v Smith, is that reliable evi-
dence ought not to be excluded simply because it cannot
be tested by cross-examination. However, he qualified
this by stating that the trial judge should have a residual
discretion to exclude the evidence where its probative
value is slight and it would thus be unfairly prejudicial
to the accused for it to be admitted.3
In this column, I am going to review how Canadian law
arrived at this point and illustrate by reference to two recent
decisions of the Ontario Court of Appeal that the scope of
hearsay is continuing to expand, but not without difficulties.
Let us start at the beginning.   
R. v. KHAN:
In R. v. Khan,4 the accused, a medical doctor, was charged
with sexually assaulting a three-and-one-half-year-old child. At
his trial, the Crown sought to introduce statements made by
the child (T.) to her mother (Mrs. O.), approximately fifteen
minutes after the alleged assault. The Crown argued that they
were admissible under the spontaneous-declaration exception
to the hearsay rule. The comments made by the child were as
follows:
Mrs. O.: So you were talking to Dr. Khan, were you? What did
he say? 
T.: He asked me if I wanted a candy. I said “Yes.” And do
you know what?
Mrs. O.: What? 
T.: He said, “Open your mouth.” And do you know
what? He put his birdie in my mouth, shook it and
peed in my mouth.5
The trial judge refused to admit the statements on the basis
that they were not contemporaneous with the event.6 The
Supreme Court of Canada agreed. It held that “applying the
traditional tests for spontaneous declarations, the trial judge
correctly rejected the mother’s statement.”7 However, the
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Supreme Court indicated that there was a “need for increased
flexibility in the interpretation of the hearsay rule to permit the
admission in evidence of statements made by children to oth-
ers about sexual abuse.”8 The Supreme Court held that such
evidence is admissible if it is “necessary” and “reliable:”
The first question should be whether reception of the
hearsay statement is necessary. Necessity for these pur-
poses must be interpreted as “reasonably necessary”.
The inadmissibility of the child’s evidence might be one
basis for a finding of necessity. But sound evidence based
on psychological assessments that testimony in court
might be traumatic for the child or harm the child might
also serve. There may be other examples of circum-
stances which could establish the requirement of neces-
sity.
The next question should be whether the evidence is
reliable. Many considerations such as timing,
demeanour, the personality of the child, the intelligence
and understanding of the child, and the absence of any
reason to expect fabrication in the statement may be rel-
evant on the issue of reliability. I would not wish to draw
up a strict list of considerations for reliability, nor to sug-
gest that certain categories of evidence (for example the
evidence of young children on sexual encounters)
should be always regarded as reliable. The matters rele-
vant to reliability will vary with the child and with the
circumstances, and are best left to the trial judge.9
Though Khan could be interpreted as only applying to
hearsay statements made by children in sexual assault cases,
the Supreme Court of Canada quickly dissociated itself from
such a limited interpretation. Two years after rendering its
decision in Khan, the Supreme Court of Canada extended the
principled approach set out in Khan to the admissibility of
statements made by an adult victim in a murder case. 
R. v. SMITH:
In R. v. Smith,10 the accused was charged with killing Ms.
Aritha King. At the accused’s trial, the Crown sought to intro-
duce a number of telephone calls made by the victim to her
mother. The Crown argued that these calls established that the
accused was with the victim immediately prior to her death.11
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the contents of the
deceased’s telephone calls to her mother were not admissible
under the “present intentions” or “state of mind” exceptions to
the prohibition against the admissibility of hearsay.12 However,
the Supreme Court indicated that Khan signaled “the triumph
of a principled analysis over a set of ossified judicially created
categories.”13 The Court concluded that the hearsay evidence
was “necessary” because the declarant was deceased. The
Court held that the necessity criteria will be established when
“direct evidence is not, for a variety of reasons, available.”14
The Court also held that in assessing reliability, the trial judge
should determine whether a “circumstantial guarantee of trust-
worthiness” exists.15
PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS:
R. v. Smith was followed a year later by R. v. B.(K.G.).16 In
B.(K.G.), the Supreme Court extended Khan to the introduc-
tion of prior consistent statements for the truth of their con-
tents. Significantly, in B.(K.G.), the declarants were available to
testify. The difficulty was that although they had provided
statements to the police incriminating the accused, they
recanted these statements at trial. The issue became whether
the Crown could introduce the witnesses’ police statements
not simply to contradict the reluctant witnesses but for the
truth of their contents. Relying on the common law rule which
prohibited the use of such statements for such a purpose, the
trial judge denied the Crown’s request and the accused was
acquitted. 17
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held in B.(K.G.)
that “the time has come for the orthodox rule to be replaced by
a new rule recognizing the changed means and methods of
proof in modern society.”18 The Supreme Court concluded that
prior consistent statements could be admitted into evidence
for the truth of their contents if (1) the prior statement was
made under oath or solemn affirmation, (2) the entire state-
ment was video-recorded, and (3) the opposing party had the
opportunity to fully cross-examine the witness at trial respect-
ing the statement.19 The Court held that the necessity criterion
was met because “evidence of the same value” was not avail-
able from the recanting witness or other sources.20
B.(K.G.) was followed by R. v. U.(F.J.).21 Once again the
issue of admissibility of a prior consistent statement was con-
sidered by the Supreme Court. However, this case involved a
statement a complainant had provided to the police that had
not been taken under oath or video-recorded. 
In U.(F.J.), the complainant provided a statement to the
police in which she indicated that the accused, her father, was
having sex with her “‘almost every day.’”22 The interviewing
police officer had attempted to tape the interview, but the tape
recorder had malfunctioned. After interviewing the com-
plainant, the officer interviewed the accused. The accused
admitted to having sexual intercourse with his daughter
“‘many times.’”23 He described similar sexual acts as were
described by the complainant in her police statement. At trial,
Court Review - Volume 53 49
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the complainant recanted the allegations of sexual abuse. The
issue became whether the complainant’s unrecorded statement
was admissible for the truth of its contents.
The Supreme Court concluded in U.(F.J.) that the com-
plainant’s statement was “substantively admissible” because
the “statements made by the accused and by his daughter con-
tained both a significant number of similarities in detail and
the strikingly similar assertion that the most recent sexual con-
tact between the two had been the previous evening.”24
The Supreme Court indicated in U.(F.J.) that its earlier deci-
sions were designed to ensure that the Canadian approach to
the admissibility “of hearsay as evidence would be sufficiently
flexible to adapt to new situations.”25
A FLEXIBLE APPROACH:
In R. v. Starr26 and R. v. Baldree,27 the Supreme Court of
Canada affirmed its suggestion in U.(F.J.) that the principled
approach should be sufficiently flexible to apply to a multitude
of hearsay issues. 28
In Starr, the Supreme Court of Canada held that if the pro-
posed hearsay evidence was admissible within a traditional
hearsay exception, the evidence “may still be inadmissible if it
is not sufficiently reliable and necessary. The traditional excep-
tion must therefore yield to comply with the principled
approach.”29 In Baldree, the Supreme Court of Canada indi-
cated that hearsay evidence is admissible if it falls under a tra-
ditional exception to the hearsay rule or if the principled
framework of necessity and reliability is established. 30
SPOUSAL INCOMPETENCY:
In R. v. Hawkins,31 the Supreme Court applied Khan to the
issue of spousal testimonial incompetence. The Court held
that the principled approach made the introduction of hearsay
necessary in that case because the witness, the accused’s
spouse, was incompetent to testify.32 Subsequently, however, in
R. v. Couture,33, the Supreme Court rejected that proposition
that the accused’s confession to his spouse was admissible on
the basis that it was necessary because of the spouse’s incom-
petency to testify against the accused. The Supreme Court held
that the confession was inadmissible because its admission
under the principled exception to the hearsay rule would, in
the circumstances of this case, undermine the spousal incom-
petency rule and its underlying rationales.34 The Court con-
cluded that the principled approach to the admissibility of
hearsay evidence should be applied in a manner which pre-
serves and reinforces the integrity of the traditional rules of
evidence.35
More recently, in Baldree, the Supreme Court considered the
application of its principled approach to “drug purchase
calls.”36 In the case, the accused was arrested and charged with
the offence of possessing marijuana and cocaine for the pur-
poses of trafficking. After the accused was arrested, an
unknown and unidentified person telephoned his cell phone
to arrange for a drug delivery. A police officer answered the call
and agreed to deliver the drugs at the price the accused nor-
mally charged.37 The Supreme Court concluded that none of
the traditional exceptions applied and the principled exception
was not established because of the lack of evidence concerning
reliability. The Supreme Court of Canada noted that though
the call received in this particular case was inadmissible, this
did not mean that all “drug purchase calls” were inadmissi-
ble.38
THE SUPREME COURT’S MOST RECENT CONSIDERATION
OF KHAN:
The Supreme Court of Canada’s most recent foray into the
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reliability, required by the principled approach. The
exception can be modified as necessary to bring it into
compliance.
c. In “rare cases”, evidence falling within an existing
exception may be excluded because the indicia of
necessity and reliability are lacking in the particular
circumstances of the case.
d. If hearsay evidence does not fall under a hearsay
exception, it may still be admitted if indicia of relia-
bility and necessity are established on a voir dire.45
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:
Two recent decisions from the Ontario Court of Appeal, R.
v. Zou46 and R. v. Khan,47 illustrate the ongoing difficulties
caused by the introduction of hearsay evidence and the
enlarged scope for its introduction. 
USE OF NARRATIVE EVIDENCE AS CORROBORATION:
In Zou, the accused was convicted of the offence of sexual
assault. The complainant (A.Y.) had sent an anonymous email
to the police in which she said that she had been sexually
assaulted by the accused. The Court of Appeal indicated that
A.Y.’s “email to the police was introduced into evidence during
her examination-in-chief. She read the document into the
record in its entirety and it was made an exhibit.” 48 Trial coun-
sel for the accused did not object and there was “no indication
by counsel or the trial judge of the purpose for which the email
was tendered or any limitation on its use.”49 The Ontario Court
of Appeal noted that the appeal raised “the often vexing ques-
tion of the evidentiary use that can be made of a complainant’s
prior consistent statement.”50
In convicting the accused, the trial judge referred to the
email: “I find A.Y.’s email, sent contemporaneously with the
events, to be corroboration of her evidence.”51
The accused appealed from conviction. The Ontario Court
of Appeal set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial. It
held that although the email “could be used to undermine the
defence position as to the motive for A.Y.’s false accusation,” it
could not be used to corroborate the complainant’s testimony.52
The Court of Appeal indicated that the trial judge’s “use of the
word ‘corroboration’ in the context of a prior consistent state-
ment by a witness is troubling. That word, as commonly under-
stood, refers to evidence from a source other than the witness
whose evidence is challenged which is capable of confirming
the veracity of the evidence of the challenged witness.”53
The Court of Appeal noted that the email “did not have
either characteristic required for evidence to be corroborative.
It was not from a source independent of A.Y. Nor could the
email confirm the veracity of A.Y.’s trial testimony unless the
Court Review - Volume 53 51
principled approach to the admission of hearsay is R. v. You-
varajah.39
In Youvarajah, the accused was charged with murder. The
co-accused (D.S.) pleaded guilty and signed an agreed state-
ment of facts (ASF) implicating the accused. D.S. was called as
a witness by the Crown at the accused’s trial, but DS testified
that he could not remember signing the ASF.40 The trial judge
rejected an application by the Crown to have the ASF entered
as evidence. However, the Ontario Court of Appeal set aside
the acquittal and ordered a new trial.41
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the acquittal
was restored. The Supreme Court noted that the ASF had not
been under oath nor videotaped. The Supreme Court also
noted that though the ASF was against D.S.’s interests, “the
underlying rationale for the admissibility of admissions as
against the party making them falls away when they are sought
to be used against a third party.”42 The Court ultimately deter-
mined that the ASF was not reliable:
The circumstances identified by the trial judge raise
significant concerns about the threshold reliability of the
portions of the ASF upon which the Crown sought to
rely at the appellant’s trial, all of which minimized D.S.’s
involvement in the murder. D.S. endorsed the ASF as
part of a plea bargain for second degree murder and a
sentence in youth court. In these circumstances, there
was motivation to shift responsibility to his co-accused.
D.S. was also assured that he would not have to make
any further statements to police and he testified at the
appellant’s trial that this was one of the reasons that he
had accepted the plea agreement. D.S. further testified
that he agreed to some facts in the ASF that he said he
did not or could not know and that he did not under-
stand everything that he read before agreeing to the
statement’s contents. Those portions of the ASF that
shifted responsibility for the murder to the appellant are
inherently unreliable.43
A SUMMARY:
In R. v. Mapara,44 the Court summarized its conclusions on
the admissibility of hearsay evidence through a principled
approach:
a. Hearsay evidence is presumptively inadmissible
unless it falls under an exception to the hearsay rule.
The traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule remain
presumptively in place.
b. A hearsay exception can be challenged to determine
whether it is supported by indicia of necessity and
39. [2013] 2 S.C.R. 720 (Can.).
40. Id. ¶ 10. 
41. Id. ¶ 16.
42. Id. ¶ 59.
43. Id. ¶ 69.
44. [2005] 1 S.C.R. 358 (Can.).
45. Id. ¶ 15.
46. 2017 ONCA 90 (Can. Ont.).
47. 2017 ONCA 114 (Can. Ont.).
48. Zou, 2017 ONCA 90, ¶ 26.
49. Id..
50. Id. ¶ 2.
51. Id. ¶ 33.
52. See Id. ¶¶ 35, 50.
53. Id. ¶ 40.
email was improperly used for the truth of its contents, or the
consistency between the email and A.Y.’s testimony was
improperly viewed as confirmatory of her trial testimony.”54
THE USE OF PRIOR STATEMENTS AS CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE:
In Khan, the accused, a police officer, was convicted of the
offence of sexual assault.55 The complainant was a prisoner the
accused was transporting to a police station. She alleged that
the accused sexually assaulted her while performing searches
of her in the back of a police cruiser. When the accused and the
complainant arrived at the police station, a female police offi-
cer (Constable Flint) told the complainant that she would be
searching her. The complainant became upset and said: “‘I’ve
been searched three fucking times. How many times am I
going to be searched?’”56 The trial judge ruled that this state-
ment was admissible as “‘a spontaneous utterance and as a
prior statement to assist the court with the ultimate credibility
of [the complainant].”57 The trial judge also indicated that the
statement was admissible under the principled approach to the
hearsay rule.58
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that though “the neces-
sity requirement under the principled approach does not
require that the witness be absent or unable to give evi-
dence,”59 necessity was not met in the case:
I am of the view that necessity was not met, and thus
the statement is not properly admitted under the princi-
pled approach. The complainant testified consistently
about the essential parts of the allegations. Whatever
lapses may have existed in her memory, they did not go
to the essential details of the allegation that she had been
previously searched numerous times. The record does
not establish that the complainant was unable or unwill-
ing to give a full account of events, or could not recall
significant details of the event. The necessity component
of the principled approach to hearsay is not satisfied.60
The Court of Appeal noted that as “pure narrative, prior
consistent statements carry no weight because they are ten-
dered simply to give the background to explain how the com-
plaint came to be before the court.”61 However, the Court of
Appeal also pointed out that if “the circumstances surrounding
the making of the prior consistent statement are such that the
statement assists in assessing the reliability and credibility of a
witness’s in-court testimony” this gives the “prior consistent
statements admitted as ‘narrative’ a more substantive use. . . .
This is referred to as narrative as circumstantial evidence.”62
The Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge
had “properly placed the prior consistent statement on the
scale in assessing the credibility of the complainant’s in-court
testimony by considering the circumstances in which she made
her initial complaint to Constable Flint:”63
In my view, taking the reasons as a whole, the trial
judge used the prior consistent statement for the per-
missible purpose of evaluating the context in which the
initial complaint arose, in particular the fact and timing
of the complaint, and the spontaneous nature in which
it came out, in order to assist him in assessing the truth-
fulness of the complainant’s in-court testimony. While
some of the trial judge’s language was not ideal, his
phraseology must be put in context. In referring to the
“consistency of her complaint” . . .
The trial judge properly placed the prior consistent
statement on the scale in assessing the credibility of the
complainant’s in-court testimony by considering the cir-
cumstances in which she made her initial complaint to
Constable Flint. To this extent, the prior consistent
statement does add to the credibility of the com-
plainant’s in-court testimony and had probative value
beyond mere repetition. It was evidence of the sequence
and timing of events and the emotional state of the com-
plainant at the time of the utterance, and assisted the
trial judge in evaluating the credibility of the com-
plainant’s in-court testimony. The trial judge’s use of the
prior consistent statement was proper.64
On June 29, 2017, as this issue of Court Review was headed
to the printer, the Supreme Court of Canada issued its opinion
in R. v. Bradshaw,65 where it addressed this hearsay question:
“When can a trial judge rely on corroborative evidence to con-
clude that the threshold reliability of a hearsay statement is
established?”66
The Court’s answer:
[C]orroborative evidence may be used to assess
threshold reliability if it overcomes the specific hearsay
dangers presented by the statement. These dangers may
be overcome on the basis of corroborative evidence if it
shows, when considered as a whole and in the circum-
stances of the case, that the only likely explanation for
the hearsay statement is the declarant’s truthfulness
about, or the accuracy of, the material aspects of the
statement. The material aspects are those relied on by
the moving party for the truth of their contents.67
(continued on page 86)
52 Court Review - Volume 53 
54. 2017 ONCA 90, ¶ 41.
55. 2017 ONCA 90, ¶ 1.
56. Id. ¶ 6.
57. Id. ¶ 7.
58. Id.
59. Id. ¶ 21.
60. Id. ¶ 23.
61. Id. ¶ 30.
62. Id. ¶ 31.
63. Id. ¶ 44.
64. Id. ¶¶ 43-44.
65. 2017 SCC 35 (Can.).
66. Id. ¶ 3.
67. Id. ¶ 4.
Court Review - Volume 53 53
Footnotes
1. See Ron Acierno et al., National Elder Abuse Mistreatment Study
(2009) (the actual rate of mistreatment in the U.S. is likely higher
than that reported in the study as the study did not include older
adults with significant cognitive impairment, a demographic at
heightened risk for mistreatment).
This special issue focuses on the courts’ role in respondingto elder mistreatment.  Elder mistreatment is a phenome-non that includes not only physical, psychological, and
sexual abuse, but also the financial exploitation and neglect of
older adults.  
This is an important topic as elder mistreatment is dis-
turbingly common.  Surveys suggest that well over 10% of older
adults in the United States experience mistreatment each year.
For example, in a 2009 survey of non-institutionalized persons
age 60 and older in the continental United States, 11% reported
that they had experienced neglect or physical, emotional, or
sexual abuse in the past year, and 5% reported they had experi-
enced financial exploitation by a family member during that
period.1
Elder mistreatment is an especially important concern for
the courts because the issue of elder mistreatment enters the
courtroom in a variety of postures.  
The issue may be directly before the court, with the trier-of-
fact tasked with determining whether mistreatment occurred or
the legal consequences of that mistreatment.  A variety of civil
causes of action can be brought in response to elder mistreat-
ment.  Some forms of mistreatment give rise to a claim in that
sounds in tort, such as a claim for battery (for a physical
attack), intentional infliction of emotional distress (for psycho-
logical abuse), or negligence (for caregiver neglect).   Other
forms of mistreatment may give rise to a contract claim.  For
example, a care provider who fails to provide agreed-upon ser-
vices may be liable for breach of contract.  Similarly, financial
exploitation cases may include claims for fraud or breach of
fiduciary duty.
The issue of elder mistreatment may also be directly before
the court in criminal cases in which the state seeks to hold
defendant criminally liable for abuse or exploitation.  Perpetra-
tors of elder mistreatment can be prosecuted for traditional
common-law crimes (e.g., battery, assault, rape, and
manslaughter), for statutory crimes that apply to people across
the age spectrum (e.g., fraud), or for specialized crimes
designed to address elder abuse and neglect (e.g., abuse of a
vulnerable adult).
Many times when the issue of elder mistreatment is in the
courtroom, it is not explicit.  Rather than being the immediate
issue in the case, it is the part of the context in which the pro-
ceeding occurs.  For example, a guardianship petition may be
brought because a petitioner is concerned that the respondent
is being exploited or by a petitioner who is exploiting the
respondent and who seeks to use the guardianship process to
gain greater control over the respondent’s affairs.  An older
adult may face eviction proceedings as a result of losing savings
to financial exploitation.  An elderly party to an action may be
pressured or misled into pursuing or dropping a claim, or a suit
may be brought in the name of the older adult without the
adult’s informed or voluntary consent.  
Thus, courts have an important role to play not only in hold-
ing perpetrators of mistreatment responsible, but also in ensur-
ing that courts and legal processes are not used to facilitate
abuse.  Indeed, if courts are not attuned to looking for mis-
treatment and its signs, they may unwittingly enter orders that
facilitate that abuse.
Each of the articles in this special issue, therefore, addresses
a challenge or concern faced by the courts in responding to the
phenomenon of elder mistreatment.  
Dr. Laura Mosqueda’s article discusses the medical science of
abuse and forensic markers of mistreatment. Drawing on her
background as a geriatrician and one of the nation’s foremost
experts in elder abuse, Mosqueda provides valuable insight into
how to detect mistreatment and differentiate injuries due to
mistreatment from those of non-culpable origin.
Judge Patrica Banks’s essay shares her experience creating a
specialized elder court in Cook County, Illinois.  Judge Banks
draws on her experience to suggest how other court systems
could follow this lead, and the potential advantages of doing so.
My own article explores the ethical obligations of attorneys
when they represent someone for a surrogate decision maker
(such as a guardian or agent under a power of attorney) has
been appointed.  It aims to inform courts about expectations for
attorney behavior and to help courts to identify cases in which
an attorney may be facilitating an agent’s exploitation of a vul-
nerable person.
Prosecutor Page Ulrey’s essay describes what she has learned
as one of the nation’s leading prosecutors of elder abuse about
the successful prosecution of such abuse.  It explores common
misconceptions triers-of-fact have about mistreatment, and
how prosecutors can overcome those misconceptions.
Finally, Professor Robert Dinerstein’s essay looks at the
responsibilities of a guardian, and the challenges guardians face
in making decisions that respect the personhood of those sub-
ject to guardianship, by drawing on his personal experience as
guardian for his sister.  Dinerstein, a disability-rights scholar,
explores how he puts “best practice” for empowerment of the
person subject to guardianship into practice in a deeply per-
sonal context.
Together, these perspectives shed light on how courts, and
those who come before them, can better meet the needs of vic-
tims of elder mistreatment.
Nina A. Kohn is the Associate Dean for Research and David Levy
Professor of Law at the Syracuse University College of Law; she
helped organize this special issue of Court Review. (For more com-
plete biographical information about Professor Kohn, see page 69.)
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The crime of elder abuse takes many forms: financial, emo-tional, sexual, and physical abuse, as well as neglect. Inmany (perhaps most) circumstances, multiple forms
coexist and this is referred to as polyvictimization. As in child
abuse and domestic violence, people who are victimized tend
to be vulnerable for a variety of reasons that span from physi-
cal to cognitive to psychological domains. This article outlines
several aspects of age-related physical changes and highlights
those features of aging that can make an older adult suscepti-
ble to elder abuse and neglect. We will go on to describe phys-
ical manifestations and laboratory markers, as well as the role
of medication in abuse and neglect. Finally, we will address the
topic of capacity. Throughout the article, we will indicate how
knowledge in these areas can enhance the functions of the
court in cases of suspected elder abuse and neglect.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND
There are more than 41 million Americans currently over
the age of 65, and with 10,000 people turning 65 every day,
older adults comprise the fastest growing portion of the U.S.
population. Recent studies have shown that at least one in ten
Americans over the age of 60 has experienced abuse and many
have experienced multiple forms of abuse.1 Another study
found that nearly half of people with dementia experience
abuse.2
With this dramatic rise in the number of older adults cou-
pled with ongoing efforts to identify, report, and prosecute
elder abuse cases, our U.S. courtrooms will see an increase in
the volume of cases involving some form of elder abuse or
neglect. Although facts and evidence in an elder abuse case are
usually complex, the decision of the court often rests on
whether the injuries are caused by abuse or neglect versus a
result of normal aging processes and/or an accident. Medical
evidence including photos of injuries, laboratory reports, and
medical documentation can be introduced as evidence. Under-
standing the difference between normal aging and markers for
abuse and neglect is essential to recognizing abuse and evalu-
ating the evidence that is presented. 
Other functions of the court involve adjudicating cases that
require guardianship and conservatorship decisions on behalf
older adults who perhaps are no longer capable of making
decisions on their own behalf. Tests evaluating cognition,
capacity, and functional ability are a mainstay of testimony and
evidence in these cases and all may contribute to making a
decision that best serves the older adult. There are a variety of
experts who may provide testimony in court. Familiarity with
their training and areas of expertise can contribute to a better
understanding of professional testimony and a discerning eye
as to the appropriateness of a geriatric professional in address-
ing a particular question. 
All of us make assumptions and have biases, be they con-
scious or unconscious. Our attitudes, experiences, back-
grounds, assumptions, and fears about aging and older adults
and family violence may lead to misconceptions that nega-
tively impact an older adult during a trial. It is therefore impor-
tant to be aware of our own predispositions and to be knowl-
edgeable about the basics of aging so that we can understand
common myths and misconceptions as such. Some common
misconceptions are:
• Old people bruise easily therefore it’s not possible to tell if
someone hit them
• It’s expected to get pressure sores when you’re at the end
of life
• People with dementia don’t feel pain
• It’s normal for old people to be confused
Example: A 92-year-old woman is pushed into the court-
room in a wheelchair. She is hunched over due to osteoporo-
sis and is unable to look up. She looks a little disheveled and
presents as a tiny body in a big chair. She gives the impres-
sion of being frail and weak. It does not seem possible to
those around her that she actually is one of the sharpest peo-
ple in the room. If accommodations to assure she can hear
the proceedings, see the goings on, and be heard by people in
the courtroom are not made, it may simply validate an
assumption of her incompetence without questioning the ini-
tial perception.
B. TERMINOLOGY AND TYPES OF PROFESSIONALS
Frequently in cases that involve allegations of elder abuse or
neglect, professionals with advanced training in the aging
process are referenced in documents and called upon for their
technical skills in court proceedings. Terminology and titles
can be confusing; several disciplines have overlapping areas of
expertise and a particular discipline or title without requisite
experience does not guarantee appropriate proficiency. For
example, several different specialties may have the background
(training, skills, knowledge, experience) to make an evalua-
tion of cognitive abilities. Physicians, including geriatricians,
neurologists, and psychiatrists, may be able to make a deter-
mination, as well as psychologists who specialize in geropsy-
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chology or neuropsychology. Geriatric professionals involved
in courtroom proceedings should have both the technical
training and experience as a practitioner if they are going to be
involved in the often life-altering decision that goes along with
a capacity assessment. 
Many scholarly and professional fields focus on older
adults. Gerontology is the study of aging and older adults. It is
a diverse field that includes the study of physical, mental, and
social changes in people as they age, changes in society due to
an aging population, and how this knowledge can be applied
to policies and programs. People can get masters degrees and
PhDs in gerontology. Geriatrics is the study of health and dis-
ease in later life. It includes the health care of older people, as
well as the health and well-being of their caregivers. Many
types of professional fields have advanced training in geri-
atrics. Of those, primary care physicians, psychiatrists, phar-
macists, nurse practitioners, and psychologists are the most
commonly involved in the in evaluation and testimony in elder
abuse cases. 
While many primary care physicians who provide care for
older adults may have expertise by virtue of their experience
and independent study, only board-certified geriatricians have
completed a fellowship and passed a certifying exam as experts
in the assessment and medical care of older adults. Just as a
pediatrician specializes in care of children because children are
not simply small adults, a geriatrician specializes in care of
older adults because of the unique health care needs of this
population. One of the most important things that a geriatri-
cian can contribute to an alleged elder abuse case is the ability
to make both cognitive and physical assessments of alleged
victims of abuse. Additionally, geriatricians are able to review
prior medical records for signs of abuse or neglect, as well as
screen for modifiable signs of cognitive impairment such as
delirium or medication side effects. 
Similarly, geropsychiatrists or geriatric psychiatrists have
completed a fellowship and passed a certifying exam. They
have special expertise in normal and pathologic changes in
mental health and cognition that can occur with aging. Both
geriatricians and geropsychiatrists have received special train-
ing to address the different health problems that older adults
may face compared to younger people. These professionals
may provide necessary evaluations for suspected elder abuse
victims and offer expert testimony to assist in cases of sus-
pected elder abuse. 
In the field of psychology, there are two particularly relevant
subspecialties. A neuropsychologist specializes in the applied
science of brain-behavior relationships. A geropsychologist spe-
cializes in the cognitive, behavioral, and developmental
changes that occur with aging. Neuropsychologists are usually
board certified through the American Board of Clinical Neu-
ropsychology. Board-certified geropsychologists must com-
plete formal geropsychological training and pass a national
board certification. Both a neuropsychologist and a geropsy-
chologist are well-qualified to determine issues such as deci-
sion-making capacity and to
assist with assessing and
understanding an older per-
son’s cognitive function with
relation to their ability to pro-
vide consent. Like their physi-
cian colleagues, a geropsychol-
ogist may have the ability to
assess, retrospectively, cogni-
tion by reviewing past records
and interviews. 
Typically, geropsychologists conduct a cognitive assessment
with a battery of validated tests to determine the degree of
impairment in different cognitive domains, including execu-
tive functioning, attention, memory, and concentration, among
others. This testing evaluates the alleged victim’s relative
strengths and weaknesses in these various cognitive domains.
Understanding how other factors of mood and mental health
may be impacting an older adult’s functioning and cognition is
another important part of evaluation performed by a geropsy-
chologist.3
Because medication often plays an important role in the
cognition and function of an older adult, a geropharmacologist
may be engaged in evaluating medications used by an alleged
victim of elder abuse. Through training geropharmacologists
understand how age-related physiological changes affect med-
ication therapy in older adults and evaluate for appropriate
dosing and use of medication
II. NORMAL AGING AND ACCIDENTAL/INCIDENTAL
INJURY VS. MARKERS OF ABUSE
Heterogeneity is the hallmark of aging; the older we get, the
more different we become. The influence of environmental,
genetic, and lifestyle factors accumulate in different ways for
different people. Many older adults are healthy and active,
while others are more frail and disabled by ill health. Yet all of
us experience some physiological changes as we age. These
factors combine and contribute to a slew of normal and com-
mon age-related changes that can make it difficult to detect or
prove abuse and neglect. In fact, it is usually possible to find a
reason other than abuse or neglect to explain a fracture, bruise,
or pressure sore. Skin and bones become more fragile as the
human body ages, making older adults more vulnerable to
injury. Medications and declining functional abilities are addi-
tional variables that can contribute to increased susceptibility
to injury. For example, medications known as “blood thinners”
may cause older adults to bruise more easily (although some
trauma is still required to rupture the blood vessel) and create
more pronounced bruising. In addition, when older adults take
skin-thinning medications, like steroids, tears can happen
more easily. Changes in gait and balance make an older adult
more likely to stumble or fall, which can result in a number of
injuries like abrasions (scrapes) or lacerations (cuts), or even
fractured bones. 
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Knowing the difference
between a common age-
related accidental or inciden-
tal injury and a marker for
abuse or neglect requires
being keenly aware of the
subtle differences in the loca-
tion, pattern, and context of these injuries. Several of these
injuries, like abrasions and bruising, can retain the pattern of
an object used to inflict the injury and give insight into the
cause of the injury. Injury location on the older adult’s body is
an important factor in determining the cause of injury. Any
injury to the eyes, nose, or mouth are less likely to be acciden-
tal.4 Generally, injuries in areas of the body that are not com-
monly impacted during daily activities should arouse suspi-
cion for abuse.5 For example, abrasions sustained through
accidental or incidental injury are most often found on limbs.
Similarly, skin tears are more likely to occur on forearms and
less frequently on legs. Individuals generally have less than one
or two of these injuries at a time when there is no abuse. Evi-
dence of skin tears and abrasions in sites other than arms or
legs or multiple tears should raise suspicion for potential mis-
treatment. 
A. BRUISING
Likewise, accidental bruises occur in predictable places
with over 90% found on the extremities.6 Despite popular per-
ception, the color of a bruise is not an accurate predictor of its
age.7 Size also matters. Frequently, larger bruises (> 5 cm)
more commonly appear on older adults who have been
abused. All older adults with at least one bruise larger than 5
cm or bruising on the head, neck, ears, lateral right arm, or
posterior trunk, genitalia, buttocks, or the soles of the feet
should trigger concerns for elder mistreatment.8 Other con-
siderations of location and pattern include abrasions and or
bruising around the wrists or ankles, which may signal the use
of forcible restraint. 9 Bruising patterns suggestive of defensive
postures or related to grasping or squeezing should also
prompt suspicion.10 Judges will likely need expert testimony
to make any conclusions, but awareness of what to look for
may prompt appropriate questions to guardians or referral to
an expert.11
B. AGE-RELATED BONE CHANGES AND MARKERS FOR
PHYSICAL ABUSE
Beginning around the age of 30, there is a steady decrease in
bone density. For women there is accelerated loss around the
time of menopause. If bone density declines beyond a certain
point, defined using DEXA (dual energy x-ray absorptiometry)
scanning, it is called osteopenia. A further decline may result
in the disease known as osteoporosis. As bone density
decreases, the ease with which a trauma can cause a fracture
increases. A fall that might have resulted in nothing more than
embarrassment at the age of 45 may result in a hip fracture at
the age of 85. Frequently, an older adult is diagnosed with a
fracture due to an accidental fall. The bone injuries most com-
monly sustained by older adults from accidental injury or fall
include vertebral fractures and hip fractures for those over the
age of 75 and wrist fractures for women under the age of 75.12
Generally, fractures that are not hip, upper arm, or vertebral
fractures should give pause to consider whether mistreatment
played a role in the injury.13 Specifically, fractures anywhere on
the face, including around the eyes, the nose, or jaw, can be a
sign of blunt force trauma.14 Fractures of the skull, cervical
spine, and ribs are more likely a result of physical assault than
limb fractures. Although a spiral fracture, even of a large bone
found in the limbs, may signal that the mechanism of the
injury involved a twisting force, which is highly suggestive of
abuse.15
Often, older adults that are victims of abuse will have mul-
tiple injuries in various stages of healing. A delay in seeking
medical attention for severe injuries should trigger considera-
tion of physical mistreatment.16
C. PRESSURE ULCERS
Pressure ulcers, also called “pressure sores” or “bed sores,”
are localized injuries to the skin and/or underlying tissue
caused by pressure, or pressure combined with a shearing
force, typically over a bony prominence.17 When establishing
whether pressure ulcers are a result of neglect there are a num-
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ber of confounding factors. Conditions that affect one’s mobil-
ity, such as advanced stage dementias, Parkinson’s disease,
stroke, frailty, and deconditioning, all increase the risk of a
pressure sore. Other contributing factors include moisture,
malnutrition, and impairment of the microcirculatory system
due to acute or chronic illness.18
Pressure ulcers are categorized using four stages with stage
1 being the least severe and stage 4 being the most severe.19 At
stage 1, a pressure ulcer is a nonblanchable and reddish section
of intact skin. At stage 2, a pressure ulcer is a shallow open
ulcer with a clean red wound base. At stage 3, a pressure ulcer
appears as a deeper ulcer with subcutaneous fat and may
include undermining and tunneling. At stage 4, the pressure
ulcer is the deepest and may expose tendons, muscles, and
even bone. Some ulcers may be unstageable due to superficial
coverings of slough or eschar. This covering must be removed
before an ulcer can be staged. In addition, suspected deep tis-
sue injuries are categorized as a localized area of purple or
maroon colored skin or blood-filled blister due to damage of
underlying soft tissue. In this case, the injury begins at the
bony prominence or deep tissue layer and spreads to the
skin.20
Pressure ulcers are more common in older adults who are
immobile, but caregivers should assist in ulcer prevention by
using good care management techniques, including reposi-
tioning pressure-sensitive areas of the body every 2-3 hours. 
Markers of neglect include pressure ulcers associated with
malnutrition and/or dehydration, which hasten skin break-
down. Another marker for neglect is an immobile older adult
who is left alone for extended periods and is unable to get to
the bathroom or reposition himself or herself. In these situa-
tions, the older adult often develops avoidable pressure ulcers
due to skin breakdown from constant exposure to excess mois-
ture and bacteria from urine and feces, as well as decreased cir-
culation in the skin around bony prominences. 
However, because pressure ulcers may develop regardless of
adequate care management techniques, an expert should eval-
uate them to determine whether neglect could be a contribut-
ing factor.21
III. AGE-RELATED SENSORY CHANGES IN THE OLDER
ADULT
Decreased visual and auditory acuity are common age-
related occurrences and can present multiple challenges and
vulnerabilities for the older adult. Age-related hearing loss,
known as presbycusis, is experienced by more than 50% of
people over 75 years old, and nearly all adults who are 90 years
or older.22 Diminished hearing may make it difficult to follow
conversations or directions. If an older adult does not
acknowledge his hearing loss
or if it is not known to be a
problem, he may seem to be
cognitively impaired when, in
fact, his apparent confusion is
due to the hearing difficulty. 
Common age-related con-
ditions that reduce visual acu-
ity include presbyopia,
cataracts, glaucoma, and mac-
ular degeneration. Presbyopia
is the term used to describe an
inability to see clearly at an
arm’s length or closer. Without
corrective lenses, this condi-
tion limits the ability for an older person to read a document.
Cataracts are the gradual clouding of the lens, which, without
intervention, over time can completely obscure vision. It is
easily treatable through outpatient surgery with a very high
likelihood of a successful outcome. Macular degeneration is a
loss of central vision, making things look shadowy or fuzzy,
and it can result in blindness over time although some forms
are amenable to treatment. Glaucoma causes gradual vision
loss over time due to elevated pressure inside the eye and, if
not treated, can cause blindness.23 A person with glaucoma
may experience blank spots in their vision and eventually tun-
nel vision as the optic nerve becomes increasingly damaged. A
compromise in visual acuity can cause the older adult to
become more vulnerable to mistreatment due to a diminished
functional ability in reading, driving, or other activities that are
important for independent functioning. Significant loss in
vision may compromise one’s ability to identify an assailant or
to read a legal document. 
Special accommodations should be taken in the courtroom
to help older people with vision or hearing loss to assist with
more complete and accurate testimony. Providing more light or
magnification, or having something read aloud, may assist a
person with vision loss. For people with significant hearing
loss people should speak as clearly as possible, allowing the
older adult to see their lips. If personal hearing aids are not
available or helpful, other amplification devices such as a
Pocket Talker are small, simple, and inexpensive, and are read-
ily available. In cases of extreme hearing loss, written commu-
nication may be best. 
IV. FUNCTION
Frailty is recognized as a medical syndrome characterized
by symptoms such as fatigue, weakness, slowed walking speed,
weight loss, and a low level of physical activity. Older persons
18. Id.; Lisa M. Gibbs, Understanding the Medical Markers of Elder
Abuse and Neglect: Physical Examination Findings, 30 CLINICS GERI-
ATRIC MED. 687 (2014).
19.For a set of color diagrams showing each stage of pressure ulcers,
see Stages of Pressure Sores, WebMD, available at
http://www.webmd.com/skin-problems-and-treatments/four-stages-of-
pressure-sores (last visited June 21, 2017).
20.Gibbs, supra n. 18. 
21. Id.
22.A.C. Davis, Epidemiological Profile of Hearing Impairments: The
Scale and Nature of the Problem with Special Reference to the Elderly,
111 ACTA OTO-LARYNGOL (SUPP. 476) 23 (1990).
23.Rawan Tarawneh & James E. Galvin, Neurologic Signs in the
Elderly, in BROCKLEHURST’S TEXTBOOK OF GERIATRIC MEDICINE AND
GERONTOLOGY 101 (Howard M. Fillit, Kenneth Rockwood & Ken-
neth Woodhouse eds., 7th ed. 2010).
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who are frail are also more vulnerable to abuse and less able to
recover from illness and trauma.
When assessing for possible abuse or neglect, understand-
ing a person’s functional status is critically important. Clini-
cians who make these assessments often divide a person’s func-
tional activities into two categories: Instrumental Activities of
Daily Living (IADLs) and Activities of Daily Living (ADLs).
IADLs are those activities linked to independent living in the
community. These include handling one’s own finances, man-
aging medications, driving or taking public transportation, and
preparing meals. If a person requires assistance with some of
these activities that can often be arranged through family,
friends, or paid assistance.
ADLs are those activities needed to live independently in
one’s own home. Activities of daily living include feeding one-
self, toileting, mobility, dressing, and bathing. People who are
independent with ADLs may be able to remain in their own
home with assistance with things such as meal preparation and
transportation. However, if a person requires assistance with
these basic activities of daily living, then in-person help is
likely required for them to remain at home safely.
Example: An 81-year-old woman (Mrs. G) was brought
to the emergency room with a swollen tender ankle. Radi-
ographs showed a fracture of the distal tibia and fibula (the
two bones in the lower leg, close to where they articulate
with the foot). Mrs. G had advanced Alzheimer’s disease
and was unable to say how this injury happened. Her pri-
mary caregiver, a daughter, said that Mom fell out of bed
yesterday and she rushed her to the hospital as soon as she
noticed the injury this morning. Upon examination it was
noted that she also had pressure sores on her buttocks and
bruising on her upper arms.
When information regarding Mrs. G’s functional status
was obtained it was learned that she required assistance
with almost all activities of daily living. How would some-
body who is unable to get out of bed by herself fall and frac-
ture her lower leg? Moreover, the presence of a pressure sore
means that she has very limited mobility while in bed and
so even falling out of bed would be a highly unlikely event.
This is a circumstance in which we have an older adult who
was unable to give a history due to her cognitive impair-
ment but in which physical findings do not correlate with
the story provided by the caregiver. It is also easy to imag-
ine that if she was brought to the emergency room the story
of a confused older woman with osteoporosis and a broken
bone might not raise any suspicion.
V. MEDICATION MISUSE 
As we age the body’s response to medication changes. Phar-
macokinetics, the way in which the body absorbs and elimi-
nates medication, and pharmacodynamics, the way in which
medication is distributed and acts on our bodies, are both
altered as a normal part of the aging process. Illnesses such as
kidney disease and liver disease may further exacerbate these
changes, making older adults exquisitely sensitive to side
effects such as confusion, sedation, dizziness, unsteadiness,
agitation, loss of appetite, and constipation. While medications
play an important role in curing or treating disease, they
become toxic and dangerous when dosed improperly. Seem-
ingly small changes in medication management can have the
potential to cause severe harm. Sometimes medication misuse
happens unintentionally, which might be indicated by an iso-
lated instance rather than an extended pattern of purposeful
misuse. 
Medication can be used as a weapon or tool of control.
Overuse, underuse, and misuse of medication are all methods
used in abuse or neglect. Overuse occurs when a medication is
prescribed for an indicated purpose, but is purposely given in
too high a dosage or too frequently to accomplish a goal such
as causing confusion. 
Example: Mrs. H was an 88-year-old woman with severe
pain due to advanced rheumatoid arthritis. Her doctor had
appropriately prescribed a narcotic pain medication
(codeine) for use at times when the pain was very severe.
Noting that the medication caused her to be confused, her
daughter used this as a tool for financial abuse: she surrep-
titiously added the codeine to Mrs. H’s food and then had
her sign checks.
Withholding a medication (underuse) is another way to
abuse an older adult. 
Example: Mr. B had Parkinson’s disease and required
regular doses of a medication levodopa-carbidopa
(Sinemet) to walk. Without that medication he was stiff and
barely able to move. His daughter-in-law, who was unhappy
about having him in her house, often withheld the medica-
tion so that he could not get around the house. Eventually
Mr. B was unable to get out of bed and developed large, deep
pressure sores as a result of this immobility and bone pain
due to metastatic prostate cancer. He was bed-bound, on
hospice, and was supposed to be receiving morphine on a
regular basis to keep the pain controlled. His son would
sometimes not provide the medication as a punishment
when he felt his father was being too demanding or burden-
some.
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Instrumental Activities 
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Eating/feeding oneself Meal preparation
Toileting Housekeeping
Mobility Laundry
Dressing Shopping
Bathing Managing personal finances
Continence Managing medications
Grooming Use of transportation
Use the telephone or other
communication devices
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VI. DECISION-MAKING ABILITY: COGNITION AND 
CAPACITY 
The concept of impaired decision  making is a frequent issue
in elder abuse cases. People who are impaired are at higher risk
of being abused and in turn may be unable to understand or to
report abuse. On the other hand, respecting and defending a per-
son’s autonomy is a cherished principle. The gray area of “every-
one has a right to make a bad decision” becomes closer to black
and white when a person is obviously demented. Cognition and
capacity are important concepts related to decision-making abil-
ity. Psychosocial factors are also important to consider because
depression, reduced feelings of well-being, lower levels of social
support, or loneliness may also increase risk of elder abuse.24
Cognition is a term that encompasses many brain functions,
including complex attention, executive function, learning and
memory, language, perceptual-motor skills, and social cogni-
tion. Normal aging is accompanied by structural and func-
tional brain changes that may only become apparent under
stressful circumstances such as highly technical or fast-paced
environments or unfamiliar and stressful situations,25 such as
appearing in a courtroom. 
Capacity is related to but not the same thing as cognition.
Capacity refers to a continuum of decision-making abilities.26
Capacity is sometimes broken down into two main types: deci-
sional capacity and executional capacity. Decisional capacity
refers to a person’s ability to complete a specific task or make
a specific decision such as driving a car or refusing medical
treatment.27 Executional capacity refers to a person’s ability to
implement a decision such as the ability to manipulate money,
pay bills, or maintain a checkbook.28 Capacity may impact
decisions that older people make in regards to their health,
finances, and other areas of their lives. Capacity is rarely an all-
or-none phenomenon: while an older adult may lack capacity
in one area, he or she may retain it in others. 
When an older person’s decision-making ability seems com-
promised, a medical evaluation to review their physical and
psychological status should be conducted to reveal any condi-
tions that may benefit from treatment. It is important to see if
capacity can be restored rather than assume that it is a perma-
nent condition. Sometimes capacity may not be fully restored
but may be improved such that an older adult is able to partic-
ipate in some decisions.
Dementia, called “major neurocognitive disorder” in the
DSM 5, is a syndrome in which a person has difficulty in one
or more cognitive domains such that he is unable to do his
usual activities such as paying bills or preparing meals. While
Alzheimer’s disease is often used as the prototypical dementia,
it is important to recognize there are many causes of dement-
ing illnesses. Alzheimer’s disease and vascular dementia
(dementia due to strokes or chronic lack of adequate blood
flow to the brain) are the most common causes of dementia.
Both impair memory and executive function in the early
stages. Another type of dementia called Frontotemporal lobe
dementia causes profound changes in personality in the early
stages along with memory loss. Lewy Body dementia is char-
acterized by memory loss, visual hallucinations, and muscle
rigidity in its early stages. 
No matter the cause of the dementia, a variety of things can
cause excess disability. These include untreated (or inadequately
treated) illness such as thyroid disease, medication side effects,
and/or metabolic abnormalities. A person with Alzheimer’s dis-
ease who is hypothyroid (a low thyroid condition) and
depressed may have a significant amount of decision-making
capacity restored when both of those conditions are adequately
treated even though the underlying dementia remains. Trained
clinicians use standardized capacity interviews and cognitive
assessment tools along with structured interviews to help deter-
mine a person’s capacity to make a particular decision at a par-
ticular time. It is common to be asked to determine a person’s
capacity at a time several years before appearing in court based
on a review of records and a present-day assessment. While this
is not always possible to do, there are times when it can be
accomplished with a high degree of accuracy. For example, the
trajectory of Alzheimer’s disease is such that a person with
advanced dementia would not have had capacity to consent to a
complicated financial transaction one year ago. 
Decision-making ability fluctuates over time and with
changing external factors.29 With the help of trained clinicians,
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Complex attention – The ability to pay attention or focus
on a specific stimulus in an environment with multiple
stimuli; the ability to recall new information, such as
reporting what was just said.
Executive function – The ability to plan, make decisions,
hold information briefly in memory to manipulate, respond
to feedback, or demonstrate mental flexibility.
Learning – The acquisition of skills or knowledge.
Memory – The expression of learned skills or knowledge.
Language – The ability to speak or understand spoken or
written language.
Perceptual-motor skills – The ability to interact with the
environment by combining the use of senses and motor
skills.
Social Cognition – The ability to recognize others’ emo-
tions or what they are thinking.
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judges should understand
how cognition and capacity
are relevant to decision mak-
ing and be able to recognize
signs of abuse while simulta-
neously promoting and
maintaining autonomy. 
Example: A 72-year-
old man with end-stage
prostate cancer is being
cared for by his 38-year-
old son. He is on hospice
and has morphine avail-
able for pain control.
Another family member finds him at home alone one day
and sees that he appears to be emaciated and in a great deal
of pain. He is taken to the hospital where blood tests reveal
severe dehydration and malnutrition. It was also noted that
there were no detectable levels of morphine in his blood;
however, there was regular resupply of morphine through
the hospice agency. It was finally determined that his son
was using and selling morphine rather than giving it to his
father. When the father was fed and hydrated, and his pain
was controlled, he regained his decision-making capacity. 
VII. LABORATORY FINDINGS
There are a variety of conditions that can be discovered or
suspected based on laboratory data, such as malnutrition and
dehydration. It is important to interpret blood test results in the
context of the person’s medical conditions and medications. 
Abnormal laboratory findings can be suggestive of misman-
agement of chronic illnesses. For example, people with diabetes
are expected to have their hemoglobin A1C within a certain
range. If this test is markedly above an acceptable level, it sug-
gests poor control of diabetes. Similarly, people who are on anti-
coagulant medications such as warfarin should have a labora-
tory test to assure that they are receiving the correct amount of
medication. For older adults who depend on a caregiver to
administer medications, significantly abnormal laboratory val-
ues may be a marker of abuse or neglect.Overdosing or under-
dosing medications may also be picked up on the blood test. 
VIII. SEXUAL ABUSE
Both men and women experience physical changes that can
contribute to increased potential for injury during intercourse.
A reduction in hormones can diminish erections in men and
increase fragility of the vagina, which can lead to injury even
during consensual sex. As with other forms of abuse, it is
important to distinguish between intentional injury and inci-
dental minor trauma from a consensual sexual interaction due
to physical changes of the aging body. 
Older adults are sexually responsive and participate in a
variety of consensual sexual activities. Society tends to view
older adults as asexual, which contributes to the fact that sex-
ual abuse is one of the least acknowledged, detected, and
reported forms of elder abuse.30 Cognitive decline, as well as
diminished physical strength and ambulatory ability, can make
an older adult more vulnerable to sexual abuse. As seen in
younger populations, sexually abused older adults experience
internalized shame and self-blame, which can contribute to a
hesitancy to report abuse.31
Like other forms of physical abuse, there are markers that
raise the suspicion of sexual abuse. Physical injuries to the
mouth (hard and soft palate injuries), breasts, inner thighs,
and anogenital regions, including lacerations, abrasions, and
bruising, should evoke suspicion for sexual mistreatment. In
cases of sexual abuse, it is common to find additional trauma
in non-genital areas such as bite marks, blunt force trauma,
and secondary injuries caused by the use of restraints or suffo-
cation.32 Evidence of vaginal or ano-rectal bleeding should
trigger further investigation to rule out sexual abuse. Lab tests
that show evidence of semen may also contribute to evidence
of sexual abuse.33The development of a sexually transmitted
disease in an older adult who is unable to consent for sexual
relations or denies participating in sexual relations also raises
concern for abuse.34 Not all sexual abuse will leave a physical
marker. In fact, unwelcome sexualized kissing or fondling
remain the most common form of sexual abuse.35
Physical abuse, neglect, and sexual abuse can all create sig-
nificant emotional and behavioral repercussions, as well as the
resultant physical injuries in older adults. New onset changes
in behavior such as agitation, withdrawal from social interac-
tions, panic attacks, or signs of unexplained fear warrant fur-
ther investigation. Sometimes victims of sexual abuse can dis-
play inappropriate aggressive or unusual sexual behavior as
well.36 Depression and suicidal ideation are very common in
abuse survivors and sometimes so extreme that they can lead
to suicide attempts in older adult victims.37 When evaluating
for evidence of abuse it is important to consider the unseen
evidence in addition to identifying the physical and chemical
forensic markers of physical abuse and neglect. 
IX. CONCLUSION
A multitude of interacting physical, cognitive, emotional,
and social factors make older adults susceptible to abuse and
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neglect. Despite this complexity, it is possible to distinguish
when injuries are due to abuse rather than due to benign or
accidental causes. Figuring this out may require a variety of
experts who are particularly knowledgeable about different
aspects of the aging process. Forensic markers of abuse such as
bruises, pressure sores, and fractures must be understood in
the context in which they occurred. Medications may be mis-
used in multiple ways that cause pain, suffering, and/or confu-
sion. While abuse is categorized into specific types such as
physical abuse, sexual abuse, financial abuse, neglect, etc., the
reality is that polyvictimization is a common phenomenon.
With the rapid growth of the aging population and the greater
awareness of elder abuse as a crime, we can expect to see more
cases coming through the court system. This presents an
opportunity to create a more just society so that older adults
may age with dignity and grace.
Laura Mosqueda, MD, is a Professor of Fam-
ily Medicine and Geriatrics at the Keck School
of Medicine of the University of Southern Cal-
ifornia (USC) and a Professor of Gerontology
at the USC Leonard Davis School of Gerontol-
ogy. She directs the National Center on Elder
Abuse, a federally funded center devoted to
raising awareness and disseminating valid
information. She has published widely on this topic and has testi-
fied in criminal trials related to elder abuse and neglect. 
Theresa Sivers-Teixeira, MSPA, PA-C, is a fac-
ulty member in the Department of Family
Medicine and Geriatrics at the Keck School of
Medicine of USC. She also serves as clinical
lead for the USC Geriatric Workforce
Enhancement Project at Eisner Pediatric &
Family Medical Center.
Stacey Hirst, MPH, serves as Project Coordi-
nator at the Department of Family Medicine
and Geriatrics at the Keck School of Medicine
at the University of Southern California. Ms.
Hirst serves as Project Coordinator at the
Department of Family Medicine and Geri-
atrics at the Keck School of Medicine of USC.
She oversees the policy and research domains
of the National Center on Elder Abuse, coordinates the Abuse Pre-
vention Intervention Model (AIM) grant and the Safe at Home
Hartford Foundation grant, assists in writing research publica-
tions and abstracts, and presents on elder abuse topics to the pub-
lic and professionals. Ms. Hirst has experience working with
adults with intellectual disabilities and conducting research on
various aging topics.
Court Review - Volume 53 61
62 Court Review - Volume 53 
In 2010, I became the presiding judge of the Cook CountyElder Law Division. This short article chronicles my journeyin taking the idea of an Elder Law Division and developing
it into a workable unit of a multi-level court system. 
THE CREATION OF THE ELDER LAW DIVISION
The Circuit Court of Cook County is the second largest uni-
fied court system in the world. The Hon. Timothy C. Evans,
Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, took a bold
step when he made a decision to establish not just elder-pro-
tection courts, but an Elder Law Division, dedicated to
responding holistically to the legal needs and issues of seniors.
Changing demographics dictated that the court system be able
to respond to the rising group of baby boomers attaining the
age of 65. The 691,000 persons aged 65 and over in Cook
County at that time represented 13% of the population. 
In December 2010, Chief Judge Evans announced the estab-
lishment of the Elder Law Division and my appointment as its
presiding judge. My staff consisted of me, a secretary, and law
clerk. We were charged with laying the foundation and build-
ing the division. 
A significant challenge in creating a new division is struc-
turing it to be incorporated seamlessly into the fabric of the
existing court system. The size of the jurisdiction will dictate
the structure—a dedicated docket once weekly, a single elder-
protection court, or a separate division are all potential options.
For the Circuit Court of Cook County, the questions of shared
jurisdiction, procedural rules, definitions, criteria for determin-
ing eligibility, and logistics required in-depth planning.  
A second challenge when creating a new division is raising
awareness and educating judges about the value of a separate
division. In my case, this meant educating judges that some
older adults require special treatment because of diminished
capacity that may not be apparent in a brief court appearance.
A dedicated docket or division would be more suited to
address the issues of litigants with diminished capacity. The in-
depth planning and the awareness components had to be con-
ducted simultaneously for the blueprint for development to
move forward.
To help accomplish this important work, I used a work-
group structure, recruiting 16 persons to form my first work-
group. I then created sub-workgroups made up of representa-
tives from within and outside of the court to work on specific
tasks. Members of the workgroup included State’s Attorney,
Attorney General, elder-law professors, Public Defender, staff
of city and county Area Agencies on Aging, Probation Depart-
ment personnel, elder-law practitioners, the Public Guardian,
and law enforcement. Each brought to the group knowledge,
research skills, familiarity with the subject matter, influence,
and decision-making authority. Before the court’s involvement,
many of these same individuals had attempted to build coali-
tions to combat abuse, neglect, and financial exploitation of
older adults with moderate success. When the court assumed
a leadership role, this energized the aging network. It was
believed that access to justice for older adults was more attain-
able due to the court’s ability to adjudicate the issues and to
provide remedies. 
One of the advantages of this workgroup approach was that
it allowed me to address a significant external challenge to cre-
ating the Elder Law Division: the high expectations of the myr-
iad groups and organizations that worked with older adults
and who found the court system too unwieldy and unrespon-
sive to the needs of older adults. Many in these groups brought
hopes far greater than we could resolve on a short-term basis.
My solution was to involve these groups in the workgroup for
the planning and structure of the division. 
One of the key issues the workgroup considered was how to
define the eligibility criteria for the Elder Law Division. Illinois
law defines an elder as age 60 or older. In crafting criteria for
the Elder Law Division, the workgroup made the determina-
tion that judges should have the option to expand the eligibil-
ity definition when circumstances warranted it. 
The workgroup approach continues to prove helpful even
now that the division is more established. The planning and
implementation of the division was enhanced by the status and
influence wielded by each workgroup member. Each possessed
substantive expertise that was critical to the overall success of
the new division. Strongly motivated workgroups and task
forces have addressed many of the hurdles that the new divi-
sion has encountered. For example, a task force helped to
develop the Elder Justice Center and continues to support it.
The workgroup and task force members provided education
and training, marketing opportunities, volunteers, translators,
legal and social-service assistance, and educational materials
(i.e., literature, brochures, and pamphlets). The Center has
served more than 9,000 elderly residents since its opening in
the fall of 2013. 
KEY COMPONENTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE ELDER
LAW DIVISION
From the division’s inception to date, we have put flesh on
the bones. We have achieved:
1. A General Order that sets forth jurisdiction of the division: 
• cases arising under the Illinois Elder Abuse and Neglect
Act, 320 Ill. Comp. Stat. §§ 20/1, et seq.;
• cases arising under the Illinois Power of Attorney Act,
755  Ill. Comp. Stat. §§ 45/1?1, et seq.;
• domestic violence cases; and
• criminal offenses in which the victim is an elderly per-
son.
2. Rules and procedures to govern the division; this required
the written approval of all the Circuit Court Judges.
3. Nine judges, presiding over civil and criminal matters
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involving seniors, assigned five days a week.
4. An Elder Justice Center, with a staff of three, supported by
50 volunteers, including lawyers, social workers, and
laypersons. Services are provided to residents of Cook
County, ages 60 and over, five days a week from 8:30 a.m.
to 4:00 p.m. The Center is located on the lower level of the
Richard J. Daley Center.
5. An on-site legal clinic (a nonprofit organization under 29
U.S.C. §501(c)), serving an average of 250 seniors monthly
and housed in the Elder Justice Center.
6. An Elder Mediation Program crafted by a committee of
mediation experts (pending approval by the Illinois
Supreme Court).
7 An Illinois Abuse and Neglect Bench Card, customized and
distributed to all Circuit Court of Cook County judges.
GUIDANCE FOR OTHERS CREATING OR 
CONTEMPLATING AN ELDER-PROTECTION DOCKET
Others creating or contemplating the creation of an elder-
protection docket, court, or division may find it helpful to fol-
low the following principles, which I used in the development
of Cook County’s Elder Law Division and continue to employ:
1. Clearly define the intended beneficiaries of the division, its
mission, and any unmet needs.
2. Assemble a committed core workgroup with the requisite
expertise and skillsets to accomplish a set of goals, and set
achievable goals for the group.
3. Invite all decision makers to be a part of the workgroup.
This diversity guards against dilution of the workgroup’s
work product at a later date, and assures the final decision
makers of the level of information, discussion, and research
conducted by the workgroup.
4. Identify committee chairs and cochairs. All assignments
must be meaningful and of a nature that committee mem-
bers fully embrace and take ownership.
5. Create a timeline and avoid losing momentum. Keep moving
on some level notwithstanding roadblocks and obstacles.
6. Create an elder-friendly environment throughout the court
system. This may include the presence of assistive audio
and visual aids; clearly marked directions; signs acknowl-
edging seniors present; elder-justice banners; special
accommodations at security points; workshops for seniors;
brochures; explanatory literature and court documents in
large fonts; senior peer-counselor assistance; and sensitiza-
tion of court personnel (e.g., sheriff’s deputies, clerical staff,
court clerks, etc.).
7. Conduct exhaustive informational exchanges to include lis-
tening sessions, give-and-take discussions with judicial col-
leagues, individuals, small and large groups, bar associa-
tions, law enforcement, faith-based organizations, aging
networks, and the community at large.
8. Develop an education initiative for the benefit of judicial
colleagues, lawyers, and court personnel, aging networks,
and community at large. This initiative includes a fact sheet
as well as a bench card for broad dissemination.
9. Maximize use of media and external forces supportive of
your goals.
10. Adjust goals and retool as necessary.
CHALLENGES AND NEXT STEPS
There may be many hurdles to forming an elder-friendly
environment in the court system.  Judicial colleagues, attor-
neys, and court personnel may be reluctant to modify or
change their manner of interacting with elderly litigants. Some
judicial colleagues may refuse to acknowledge the need to offer
special accommodations to the elderly; others may refuse to
acknowledge vulnerabilities associated with aging. Where
there is an absence of laws protecting the elderly, it becomes
difficult to set eligibility criteria and set the scope of protective
services that can be provided. Finally, an absence of funding
and lack of interest from desired partners may impede the
development of a suitable model for serving the elderly.
Despite these challenges, the Cook County Elder Law Divi-
sion has flourished. Looking forward, the Elder Law Division
continues to develop. The training and assignment of judges to
preside over civil and criminal abuse, neglect, and financial
exploitation matters increased the awareness and sensitivity of
law enforcement and adult protective-service agencies, the
State’s Attorney, and others in the aging network. Demonstra-
tive of this increased sensitivity and awareness are the
increased number of cases filed and charged since the incep-
tion of the Elder Law Division. There is a need to add more
case types to the jurisdiction order; a need to amend proce-
dural rules to provide more clarity now that the rules are being
utilized; and a need to provide continuing training of judges
on issues of capacity and the complexities of the aging brain.
As the aging population grows, the issues of aging become
more complex. 
Judge Patricia Banks (JD, University of Wis-
consin) engaged in the private practice of law
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judgeship for the Circuit Court of Cook
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access to justice for the elderly. Currently, Judge Banks chairs the
15-member American Bar Association Commission on Law &
Aging, the Elder Law Committee of the National Association of
Women Judges, and the Elder Abuse Committee of the American
Judges Association. She continues to provide consultations to
jurists and others on development of elder-protection courts and
elder-justice centers, facilitate workshops, and publish articles on
elder law and elder-care issues.
The author thanks Mary Helen McNeal for her comments on an earlier
version of this article, and Catherine Koss for her insight and research
as part of earlier jointly authored work that informs this article.
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POPULATION: FINDINGS FROM AN AARP SURVEY 5 (2000),
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ econ/will.pdf (reporting that 45%
of Americans age 50 or older reported having a power of attorney
for finances, with this rate increasing with age and 73% of those
80 and over having one). In addition, surveys suggest that the
majority of older adults have appointed an agent to make health-
care decisions for them in the event they cannot make such deci-
sions for themselves. See Jaya K. Rao et al., Completion of Advance
Directives Among U.S. Consumers, 46 AM. J. PREV. MED. 65, 68
(2014) (finding, based on a national mail survey, that more than
two-thirds of adults age 55 and over had an advance directive).
2. A durable power of attorney is increasingly referred to simply as
a power of attorney (POA) and this article adopts this modern
practice. Indeed, the Uniform Power of Attorney Act takes the
position that all powers of attorney are durable unless they state
otherwise and thus uses the term “power of attorney” only. See
UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2006).
3. While actual numbers are unknown, an estimated 1.5 million
people in the United States are subject to guardianship or conser-
vatorship.
Surrogate decision-making arrangements are ubiquitous.Surveys suggest that the majority of older Americanshave a surrogate decision maker who is empowered to
make decisions on their behalf, most commonly an agent
appointed under a power of attorney (“POA”) for finances or
for health care.1 The result is that attorneys frequently repre-
sent clients who have a surrogate decision maker with the
authority to make decisions on the matter underlying the rep-
resentation.
From the perspective of the attorney, such representations
raise several important questions. First, from whom should the
attorney take direction? Should the attorney look to the surro-
gate or to the person for whom the surrogate has been
appointed? Second, with whom should the attorney communi-
cate? Should the attorney share information with the surro-
gate, the individual who appointed the surrogate, or both? 
From the perspective of a court, such representations also
raise important questions. If an attorney claims to represent a
principal for whom a surrogate has been appointed, should the
court expect the attorney to take direction from the principal
and communicate with the principal? If the attorney is not
doing so, should the court treat the principal as an unrepre-
sented party? In addition, if the attorney is not doing so,
should the attorney’s behavior be seen as a red flag suggesting
exploitation? 
This article seeks to provide guidance on the proper role of
the attorney when representing an individual for whom a sur-
rogate decision maker has been appointed. Specifically, it con-
siders two types of surrogates: (1) agents appointed pursuant
to a POA for finances,2 and (2) guardians or conservators
appointed by a court.3 In doing so, it seeks to inform the
courts about expectations for attorney behavior. This is valu-
able not only so that judges can be confident that the attorneys
appearing before them actually represent the persons whom
they allege to represent. It is also valuable because it may
empower judges to identify cases in which an attorney is either
consciously or unwittingly facilitating an agent’s exploitation
of a vulnerable person.
I. CLIENTS WITH AGENTS APPOINTED UNDER POWERS
OF ATTORNEY
A. THE CHALLENGE
Imagine that an individual comes to an attorney’s office and
presents a document that, by all appearances, is a valid POA
appointing that person as the agent (also called an “attorney-
in-fact”) for the individual who executed the document (the
“principal”). The individual asks the attorney to assist the
agent in performing an act that appears to be fully authorized
by the document. May the attorney assist? Does the attorney
have any obligation to the principal to determine the validity
of the document or to otherwise question the agent’s direc-
tions? Should and must the attorney alert the principal to the
request? And to what extent should the attorney disclose infor-
mation provided by the agent to the principal?
Similarly, imagine an attorney appears in court and identi-
fies herself as counsel to the principal. Appearing with her is
the agent appointed under the document and it is apparent
that the attorney is taking direction from the agent. Should the
court inquire as to whether the principal has been consulted or
agrees to the course of action? Should the court require the
principal’s presence? Does the answer depend on whether the
attorney reports that the principal is incapacitated? Does the
answer depend on whether the agent’s actions advantage the
agent or the agent’s associates personally?
B. THE ATTORNEY’S ROLE
When an individual who has appointed an agent under a
POA seeks representation, an attorney may look to the indi-
vidual for direction as if no such document had been executed.
This is because execution of a POA does not limit the powers
of the person executing it. Rather, the principal retains all
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4. Cf. In re Runge, 858 N.W.2d 901, 907 (N.D. 2015) (holding that
an attorney had no ethical duty to consult with an agent
appointed pursuant to a POA for health care before assisting the
principal in revoking the agent’s authority because “no guardian-
ship or conservatorship existed that withdrew [the principal’s]
authority to act for himself. Rather, [the principal] shared his
authority to act and he remained free to withdraw the authority
conferred under that power of attorney . . . .”).
5. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2002).
6. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2002).
7. 858 N.W.2d at 907.
8. 124 A.3d 1078 (DC Ct. App. 2015).
9. 124 A.3d at 1087–88 (considering the propriety of an attorney
taking action under the direction of an agent without consulting
the principal).
10. In addition, if the attorney determines that the principal wishes to
provide direction, the attorney can also use the meeting to assess
the extent to which the principal wishes to have information
about the representation shared with the agent.
11. Communication may be beneficial to the principal even if the
principal wishes to delegate provision of direction to the agent.
Communication may empower principals who have the ability to
monitor the agent and potentially to withdraw the agent’s author-
ity if the agent is acting in a matter that is inconsistent with the
principal’s wishes.
12. Reports of POA abuse are common and the elder protection com-
munity has identified POA abuse an important concern. See Nina
A. Kohn, Elder Empowerment as a Strategy for Curbing the Hidden
Abuses of Durable Powers of Attorney, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 5-7
(2006). It is estimated that in excess of 5% of older adults are sub-
ject to major financial exploitation, a category that includes POA
abuse. See RON ACIERNO, MELBA HERNANDEZ-TEJADA, WENDY
MUZZY & KENNETH STEVE, NATIONAL ELDER MISTREATMENT STUDY 6
(March 2009), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
rights he or she had before execution of the document, includ-
ing the right to engage the services of an attorney.4
The challenging issue for the lawyer is not whether the
lawyer may take direction from the principal, but whether the
lawyer must take direction from the principal. Such a situation
may arise where the agent seeks to engage the attorney to rep-
resent the principal, but seeks to limit the attorney’s interac-
tions with the principal. Here, the leading sources of ethical
guidance fail to provide the level of clarity that might be
expected given the frequency with which the issue arises. 
The only time the issue is addressed in the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct is in the comments to Rule 1.14, the rule
that addresses attorneys’ duties to clients with diminished
capacity (a situation that only captures a subset of persons who
have executed POAs). Comment 2 to Rule 1.14 instructs the
attorney to “as far as possible accord the represented person
the status of client, particularly in maintaining communica-
tion.”5 By contrast, Comment 4 to Rule 1.14 states, “If a legal
representative has already been appointed for the client, the
lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for deci-
sions on behalf of the client.”6 Thus, while one comment indi-
cates that the attorney’s default approach should be to act as
the attorney would if no such surrogate had been appointed,
the other suggests the opposite default. 
While the Comments cannot be fully reconciled, the under-
lying text of the Model Rules suggests that one way to reduce
the inconsistency is to read Comment 4 narrowly. That text
directs attorneys to maintain a normal attorney-client relation-
ship with limited exceptions, and taking direction from some-
one other than the client is not ordinary practice.
Recent court cases considering whether attorneys acted
properly in refusing to take direction from an agent provide
further support for the conclusion that Comment 4 should be
read narrowly. In the 2015 case of In re Runge,7 the North
Dakota Supreme Court took the position that Comment 4’s
direction to look to the agent for decisions was not applicable
where an attorney had independently assessed the client’s
capacity and determined that the client had capacity to make
the legal decision at issue. The same year, in In re Szymowitz,8
the D.C. Court of Appeals found that Comment 4’s direction
did not apply to a situation where
the surrogate transferred property
to himself because such “self-
dealing” was “not ordinary” prac-
tice.9 Together, these cases sug-
gest that attorneys act appropri-
ately in refusing to take direction
from an agent when a principal
with capacity wishes to provide
that direction or when an agent is
engaged in self-dealing (even
absent a finding that the self-deal-
ing constitutes a breach of the
agent’s fiduciary duty). Thus, when an attorney is asked by an
agent appointed under a POA to represent the principal, best
practice will typically be to meet with the principal before
undertaking the representation. This will allow the attorney to
determine whether the principal has the ability to provide
direction and wishes to do so, or whether the principal either
lacks that ability or would prefer to delegate to the agent.10 It
will also allow the attorney to determine the extent to which
the principal wishes to receive communication about the rep-
resentation.11 In addition, such a meeting provides an oppor-
tunity for the attorney to assess whether, including by making
the request for representation, the agent is acting in a manner
consistent with the agent’s fiduciary duty.
Best practice typically will involve such a meeting even if
the agent represents to the attorney that the principal lacks the
capacity to provide direction. Such representations by agents
are not always truthful. In some cases, the agent may not
appreciate the individual’s abilities. In other cases, the agent
may be deliberately misleading the attorney in an attempt to
use the attorney’s services to accomplish a task the agent
knows to be inconsistent with the principal’s wishes or inter-
ests. Indeed, it appears that a significant portion of financial
exploitation is accomplished through the misuse of a POA,12
sometimes with the assistance of an attorney who (presumably
unwittingly) assists the agent with transactions that constitute
impermissible self-dealing. Meeting with the principal at the
outset of the representation, especially not in the presence of
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grants/226456.pdf (last visited May 20, 2017). However, there is
not currently a clear estimate of the rate of POA-specific abuse
although attempts at estimation have been made. See, e.g., LINDA
S. WHITTON, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, NATIONAL DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY SURVEY
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS (2002), available at http://www.uniforml-
aws.org/shared/docs/power %20of%20attorney/dpasurveyre-
port_102902.pdf (last visited May 20, 2017) (reporting that 64%
of 371 attorneys surveyed by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws had encountered abuse by an
agent acting under a POA and nearly a quarter had encountered
more than ten instances of such abuse); Hans A. Lapping, License
to Steal: Implied Gift-Giving Authority and Powers of Attorney, 4
ELDER L. J. 143, 167-68 (1996) (citing a student-conducted study
by Albany Law School’s Government Law Center). 
13. A key issue for the attorney to determine at the outset of the rep-
resentation, therefore, is whether the attorney is representing the
principal or the agent. The American College of Trusts and
Estates Counsel has taken the position that which role the attor-
ney has depends on whether the attorney had a prior attorney-
client relationship with the principal. If the attorney did, then the
principal is the client. If the lawyer did not, then the lawyer rep-
resents only the fiduciary. See AM. COLL. OF TRUSTS & ESTATE
COUNSEL, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 162 (5th ed. 2016). 
14. The American College of Trusts and Estate Counsel contemplates
that the lawyer for the fiduciary will owe duties to the “disabled
person,” including to “to disclose, to prevent, or to rectify the
fiduciary’s misconduct.” Id. This is a more expansive position
than that taken by Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (allowing an
attorney to reveal “information relating to the representation . . .
to prevent, mitigate, or rectify substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result
or has resulted from the client’s commission of a crime or fraud in
furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services.”). 
15. For example, in a number of states, the right to vote is retained as
a matter of law. See Sally Balch Hurme & Paul S. Appelbaum,
Defining and Assessing Capacity to Vote: The Effect of Mental
Impairment on the Rights of Voters, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 931, 950
(2007).
the agent, can thus help thwart
such exploitation.
Should the agent seek to
restrict interaction with the
principal, best practice will
typically be for the attorney to
refuse to represent the princi-
pal under such circumstances.
A request to restrict disclo-
sures to the principal is a red
flag that the agent may be
attempting to abuse the agent’s
authority, and an attorney is
well-advised to avoid situa-
tions in which the attorney’s services may be used in further-
ance of unlawful activity. In certain cases, if the attorney
believes that the agent has good reasons for limiting disclosure,
the attorney might reasonably agree to represent the agent in
the agent’s role as a fiduciary.13 Representing the agent instead
of the principal has the potential to significantly reduce the
need to involve the principal, although it may not obviate the
need for disclosure. Even if the attorney merely represents the
agent, the attorney has certain duties to the principal, which
may include a duty to prevent the agent from misconduct or to
disclose such misconduct.14
C. THE COURT’S ROLE
Courts should be alert to the possibility that attorneys
appearing in front of them on behalf of a principal may be tak-
ing direction from the agent. In many cases, such an approach
is perfectly appropriate. However, it is not enough for the court
simply to review the appointing document to see that the
agent’s actions fall within the powers granted to the agent.
Especially where the agent has a personal interest in the out-
come of the matter before the court (e.g., where the transaction
would benefit the agent or an associate of the agent), the court
should consider the possibility that the representation may be
inconsistent with the agent’s fiduciary duty. By being vigilant to
such possibilities, the court may be able to avoid assisting the
agent in accomplishing improper acts or exploitation of the
principal. 
Courts should also recognize that the principal who has the
capacity to engage and direct an attorney is free to do so, and
that the attorney need neither consult with nor defer to the
agent in such situations. Likewise, when the principal has
capacity and objects to the agent’s actions, courts should insist
that an attorney appearing on behalf of the principal take
direction from the principal, not the agent.
II. CLIENTS WITH APPOINTED GUARDIANS OR 
CONSERVATORS
A. THE CHALLENGE
Challenging situations also arise for attorneys and for
courts when attorneys represent a person subject to guardian-
ship or conservatorship. Such representations may arise in a
variety of contexts. An individual subject to guardianship or
conservatorship may seek to challenge something related to
that arrangement—ranging from its very existence, to the pow-
ers granted the guardian, to the appointment of a particular
person as guardian or conservator. The individual may also
seek representation to address an issue unrelated to the
guardianship or conservatorship, including an issue with
regard to which the person has retained rights. These rights
may either be retained because they are retained as a matter of
state law (e.g., are not removed even when an appointment is
plenary)15 or because the court only partially removed rights
(e.g., in the case of a limited guardianship).
B. THE ATTORNEY’S ROLE
From an attorney’s perspective, two overarching issues arise
when asked to represent an individual subject to guardianship
or conservatorship: (1) may the attorney accept the represen-
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16. Traditionally, such persons have been said to be found “incapaci-
tated” and are called “wards.” The modern approach is to focus
not on the person’s status but on whether the person’s needs can
be met short of imposition of a guardianship, and to replace the
stigmatizing word “ward” with person-centered language.
17. The term “guardian” is typically used to refer to a person
appointed by a court to make decisions with respect to the per-
sonal affairs of an individual who has been adjudicated unable to
make those decisions, and the term “conservator” is typically
used to refer to a person who is appointed by a court to make
decisions with respect to the property and financial affairs of an
individual who has been adjudicated by a court to be unable to
make those decisions. However, some states use the term
“guardian” to refer to both types of appointees, and a few states
use the term conservator to apply to both. See Nina A. Kohn,
Matched Preferences and Values: A New Approach to Selecting Legal
Surrogates, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 399, 402 n.7 (2015) (discussing
state differences in terminology). 
18. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Zaltman, 843 N.E.2d 663, 664
(Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (requiring an evidentiary hearing to deter-
mine whether a woman had capacity to retain counsel to chal-
lenge the guardianship before permitting her to engage such
counsel). 
19. See generally, Nina A. Kohn & Catheryn Koss, Lawyers for Legal
Ghosts: The Ethics and Legality of Representing Persons Subject to
Guardianship, 91 WASHINGTON L. REV. 581 (2016). 
20. As courts have recognized, constitutional due-process guarantees
prohibit such an interpretation. Moreover, the doctrine of neces-
saries has been recognized as giving rise to a claim for fees by an
attorney who supplies legal services to an incapacitated individ-
ual, including those subject to guardianship seeking to terminate
that guardianship. See id. at 591–97.
21. Agents are only prohibited from performing acts the principal
cannot perform See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.04(1)
(AM. LAW INST.2006). Individuals subject to guardianship retain
many rights. These include those powers not delegated to the
guardian because the appointment is limited or because state
statutory law allows persons subject to guardianship to retain
them. It also includes the right to challenge the terms and condi-
tions of the guardianship as constitutional due-process protec-
tions render these retained rights as well. Thus, agency law does
not bar attorney representation as to these issues. For further dis-
cussion of this point, see Kohn & Koss, supra note 19, at 589–91.
22. For further discussion of this issue, see Kohn & Koss, supra note
19, at 602–04.
23. See In re Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d 419, 425 (Surr. Ct. 2010) (find-
ing that an individual subject to guardianship had a due-process
right to periodic review of the arrangement). Similarly, it is gen-
erally accepted that constitutional due-process guarantees require
individuals for whom a guardian or conservator is sought have
notice of those proceedings and an opportunity to be heard. See,
e.g., Susan G. Haines & John J. Campbell, Defects, Due Process,
and Protective Proceedings, 2 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 13, 15–16
(2000) (discussing due-process jurisprudence as applied to
guardianship proceedings).
24. Notably, the durable POA is a statutory creation that was specifi-
cally designed to overcome this common-law rule. For a history
of the POA, see Kohn, supra note 12, at 5-7.
tation, and (2) if the attorney accepts the representation, from
whom does the attorney take direction and with whom does
the attorney communicate?
1. Permissible Scope of Representation
Individuals subject to guardianship or conservatorship16
have been found by a court to be unable to make some deci-
sions for themselves and have had the right to make those
decisions delegated to a third party (alternatively called a
“guardian” or “conservator”).17 This has led some to conclude
that attorneys cannot represent such persons.18 This conclu-
sion is understandable as attorneys generally can only repre-
sent those with capacity to contract to engage the attorney and
to provide the attorney with direction as part of that represen-
tation. Nevertheless, it is erroneous. 
There is no common-law prohibition on attorneys repre-
senting people subject to guardianship. Despite some sugges-
tions to the contrary, as the author and a colleague explored in
a prior article,19 neither contract law20 nor agency law21 pre-
clude such representations. 
The conclusion that persons subject to guardianship cannot
engage an attorney is also, moreover, inconsistent with state
statutory law. Many states have adopted statutes that explicitly
or implicitly require that persons subject to guardianship be
permitted to engage counsel to represent their interests in cer-
tain conditions. In some states, there is an explicit right to
counsel, for example, to seek restoration of rights. Even more
states have adopted the “least restrictive alternative” standard
that requires a similar result. Denying an individual subject to
guardianship or conservatorship the ability to engage an attor-
ney to assist with matters
related to retained rights
(including the right to chal-
lenge the existence, terms, or
conditions of the arrangement)
violates the standard by deny-
ing the individual more rights
than is necessary for the indi-
vidual’s protection.22
Most importantly, denying
the right to counsel would vio-
late the constitutional rights of
individuals subject to guardian-
ship and conservatorship. Such individuals retain substantial
due-process rights, and exercising those rights may require
representation.23 These rights cannot be protected simply by
allowing a guardian or court to engage an attorney to represent
the individual. When the individual is challenging the exis-
tence, terms, or conditions of the appointment, the guardian or
conservator has a conflict of interest and may even be the indi-
vidual’s primary adversary. 
Although individuals subject to guardianship or conserva-
torship thus can have a right to engage an attorney, the right
is constrained. Consistent with the common-law agency prin-
ciple that an agent can only do what the principal can do,24
such persons only have a right to engage an attorney to repre-
sent them with regard to rights that are retained. However,
retained rights are not simply those rights that a court does
not strip from the particular individual. Retained rights are
also rights that state or federal law render unaffected by the
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25. Notably, these vary by state but may include fundamental rights
such as the right to vote.
26. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14(b).
27. See id. at r. 1.14(b)–(c).
28. For a decision tree outlining attorneys’ ethical duties in this
regard, see Kohn & Koss, supra note 19, at 631.
29. For a comprehensive review and discussion of state bar opinions
and court opinions on this matter, see Kohn & Koss, supra note
19, at 619–30.
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24(3) (AM.
LAW INST. 2000).
31. Id. cmt. f (“If the lawyer believes the guardian to be acting lawfully
but inconsistently with the best interests of the client, the lawyer
may remonstrate with the guardian or withdraw . . . .”).
32. It is unfortunate that some courts have mistakenly concluded that
individuals subject to guardianship cannot retain counsel or that
counsel might have to obtain court approval for engaging in such
representations.
33. There is no credible national estimate of the rate of abuse by
guardians, but reports of abuse are not uncommon. See U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-33, ELDER ABUSE: THE
EXTENT OF ABUSE BY GUARDIANS IS UNKNOWN, BUT SOME MEASURES
EXIST TO HELP PROTECT OLDER ADULTS, 6–11 (2016) (discussing
the current state of knowledge); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF., GAO-10-1046, GUARDIANSHIPS: CASES OF FINANCIAL
EXPLOITATION, NEGLECT AND ABUSE OF SENIORS, (2010) (conclud-
ing that the GAO could not determine whether guardianship
abuse is widespread, but identifying hundreds of allegations
during a 20-year period).
imposition of a guardianship
or conservatorship.25 Most
importantly, they include the
rights guaranteed as a matter of
constitutional right to due
process: the right to challenge
the existence of the guardian-
ship or the terms and condi-
tions of that guardianship. 
2. The Attorney’s Role
An attorney representing a
person subject to guardianship
or conservatorship on an issue as to which the individual has
a right to retain counsel (e.g., to challenge the existence of the
arrangement or its terms or conditions, to exercise other
retained rights, or to receive legal counsel about rights) has the
same role and ethical responsibilities as an attorney represent-
ing a client who is not subject to guardianship. This includes
the duty to provide competent representation, consult with the
individual, and take direction from the individual. This is not
to say the attorney can never deviate from the normal attorney-
client relationship. Just as with clients who have never been
adjudicated incapacitated, an attorney may—pursuant to
Model Rule 1.14—deviate from the normal relationship to take
“reasonably necessary protective action” when the lawyer rea-
sonably believes that a client has diminished capacity, is at risk
of substantial harm, and cannot act in her own interest.26 In
such situations, the attorney may reveal confidential informa-
tion or act without the consent of the client to the extent it is
“reasonably necessary to protect the client’s interests.”27 Thus,
even when protective action is appropriate, the client contin-
ues to be entitled to have her information kept confidential
unless the risk to the client justifies a breach of confidential-
ity.28
This approach is supported by state bar opinions and most
court opinions on point,29 as well as by the Restatement
(Third) of Law Governing Lawyers. The Restatement states the
general rule that an attorney should generally take direction
from a guardian, but recognizes two significant exceptions: (1)
for proceedings that are adversarial to the guardian, including
a petition to terminate the guardianship or remove the
guardian,30 and (2) in circumstances where the person subject
to guardianship has authority to act without the guardian’s
knowledge or permission (i.e., for retained rights).31
3. The Role of Courts
When faced with an attorney who purports to represent an
individual subject to guardianship or conservatorship, courts
should typically consider two questions: (1) does the individ-
ual have the authority to engage the attorney in this way, and
(2) is the attorney acting in a manner consistent with the
lawyer’s ethical duties.
As subsection B indicates, the answer to the first question
turns on what the underlying representation is about. If the
representation is to seek termination of the guardianship,
remove the guardian, or otherwise challenge the terms of con-
ditions of the guardianship, the individual has authority to
engage the attorney. Likewise, if the representation is for the
purpose of explaining his or her rights to the individual or pro-
viding assistance with regard to a retained right, the individual
also has authority to engage the attorney. By contrast, the indi-
vidual lacks authority to hire counsel to directly represent the
person to accomplish a transaction or other objective that the
person has been stripped of the right to pursue. Thus, by way
of example, if the person has had the right to sell property
removed, an attorney cannot represent the individual in the
sale of the home, but may represent the person in a proceeding
to restore the right to sell the property.
It is critical that courts not interfere with the right of an
individual subject to guardianship or conservatorship to
engage counsel in such situations.32 While all indications are
that the vast majority of guardians perform their duties in good
faith, this is not uniformly the case. Guardianships and con-
servatorships can, unfortunately, be a site of exploitation.
Reports of guardians and conservators exploiting those for
whom they are appointed abound.33 Attorney representation of
individuals subject to guardianship or conservatorship is one
antidote to abuse. An attorney can help the individual under-
stand her continuing rights, seek the removal of a guardian or
conservator who is misusing authority, and petition for the ter-
mination of an unnecessary guardianship or conservatorship.
Moreover, such representation is critical in situations in which
individuals seek to restore their rights by either terminating a
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34. See Jenica Cassidy, Restoration of Rights in the Termination of Adult
Guardianship, 23 ELDER L.J. 83, 121 (2015) (“one of the greatest
barriers to restoration is the ability of the protected individual to
hire counsel”). 
35. Such payments are permitted by the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, but are suspect. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.
1.8(f)(“A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a
client from one other than the client unless: (1) the client gives
informed consent; (2) there is no interference with the lawyer’s
independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer
relationship; and (3) information relating to representation of a
client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.”).
guardianship or conservatorship or, at least, reducing the pow-
ers delegated to the guardian or conservator.34
The answer to the second question, is the attorney acting
consistent with his or her ethical responsibilities, is most likely
to arise when there is reason to believe that the purported
counsel for the individual subject to guardianship or conser-
vator represents an interest of a person other than that indi-
vidual. Unfortunately, many guardianships and conservator-
ships occur in the context of intense intra-family disputes.
When the counsel has been arranged or paid for by a person
other than the individual subject to guardianship or conserva-
torship,35 a court may have a reasonable concern as to whether
the counsel is truly taking direction from the individual or
from someone else. 
Where the court has reason to suspect the individual is not
being truly represented by the attorney, the court may wish to
appoint a guardian ad litem, visitor, or similar person to make
further inquiries. In limited situations, the court may wish to
go further and appoint counsel for the individual. Which
approach is preferable will likely depend both on the rules of
practice for the jurisdiction and on the nature of the matter
before the court.
In short, while the notion that a person who has been
stripped of legal capacity or adjudicated unable to make legal
decisions would be able to hire an attorney may seem incon-
gruous at first blush, it is imperative that courts facilitate—not
impede—such representations. To be sure, courts should be
vigilant to the possibility that purported counsel for the indi-
vidual may be acting pursuant to the direction of someone else.
But where the attorney is truly taking direction from the person
on a matter which the person has a right to pursue, counsel
should be treated as would any other lawyer before the court.
III. CONCLUSION
It is critical for courts to understand the appropriate role of
attorneys who represent individuals with appointed surro-
gates. While all indications are that most surrogates are faith-
ful and act in a manner consistent with their fiduciary duties,
the unfortunate reality is that many do not. Being alert to the
possibility that attorneys appearing on behalf of a person for
whom a surrogate is appointed may not actually be acting at
that person’s direction or in that person’s interest allows courts
to potentially prevent certain forms of exploitation. Likewise,
by recognizing that attorneys can represent those with
appointed surrogates—including those subject to plenary
guardianship or conservatorship—courts can play a role in rec-
tifying abuse, when it does occur, by ensuring that such per-
sons have access to the judicial system. 
Nina A. Kohn is the Associate Dean for
Research and David M. Levy Professor of Law
at the Syracuse University College of Law. She
is also a faculty affiliate with the Syracuse Uni-
versity Aging Studies Institute and serves as the
Reporter for the Third Revision of the Uniform
Guardianship, Conservatorship, and Other Pro-
tective Proceedings Act, a project of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
Professor Kohn’s research focuses on elder law and the civil rights
of older adults and persons with diminished cognitive capacity;
she’s the author of Elder Law: Practice, Policy, & Problems, pub-
lished in 2014 by Aspen Publishers. She earned an A.B., summa
cum laude, from Princeton University and a J.D., magna cum
laude, from Harvard Law School.
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I didn’t know what elder abuse was when I agreed to becomeour office’s first dedicated elder-abuse prosecutor. It was2001 and Norm Maleng, my boss and the elected prosecu-
tor for King County, Washington, had decided it was time for
our office to respond to this growing issue. He had seen Paul
Greenwood, San Diego County’s elder-abuse prosecutor and a
passionate advocate for abused elders, speak on the subject
and was inspired to create a similar position here. At that time,
there were only a handful of dedicated elder-abuse prosecutors
in the country, most of them in California. 
Maleng had the foresight to know that my job would
involve more than simply prosecuting cases. My duties were
threefold: to prosecute cases, to train first responders and other
professionals to better recognize and report abuse, and to work
on improving the coordination between the county agencies
who respond to it. 
Elder abuse from a criminal-justice perspective is physical
or sexual abuse, neglect, or financial exploitation of an elder by
a trusted other. The trusted other may be a stranger who tar-
gets the elder and develops a trust relationship with them, or
it may be someone who takes advantage of a preexisting rela-
tionship and perpetrates a crime against them. The results,
even when the crime is financial exploitation, are devastating.
According to a recent study, any form of even modest elder
abuse increases the elder’s risk of premature death by 300%.1
As I educated myself on the subject, I began to look around
the office for cases to handle. I found them scattered through-
out our various units: financial exploitation was being handled
by our fraud unit, physical abuse by our domestic-violence and
mainstream trial units, and sexual assault by our special-
assault unit. The one form of abuse, I found, that none of the
units seemed to be prosecuting was neglect. So it was on that
issue that I chose to focus my new practice. Neglect was the
second most common type of referral received by Adult Pro-
tective Services (APS), so I thought there shouldn’t be an issue
with getting the cases. 
I began to do outreach to the larger police agencies in the
county, to APS, and to local hospitals. But despite my efforts,
the number of neglect cases that came in was frustratingly low.
Tracing them upstream, I found that few reports of neglect
were being made to law enforcement. Even when they were
reported, the police were rarely, if ever, investigating the cases.
This, I came to learn, was due to the fact that these cases were
extremely complicated, involving medical, financial, and cog-
nitive-capacity issues. For law enforcement to respond to them
properly, they needed both substantial training and access to
experts with whom they could consult—they had neither. Fur-
ther, law enforcement rightfully felt that there was no point in
investigating these cases because they would not result in pros-
ecution. Adult neglect had historically resided in a land of civil
lawsuits and administrative sanctions, not criminal charges.
Despite the fairly robust criminal-neglect statutes in Washing-
ton State, no one was treating these cases as criminal. 
I soldiered on. I began to conduct trainings of law enforce-
ment and other first responders on how to identify and
respond to neglect and other forms of elder abuse. With the
assistance of our Medical Examiner, I formed the King County
Elder Abuse Council, a group of stakeholders in the commu-
nity who came together every month to discuss the many sys-
temic changes that were needed in our county in order for us
to begin to prevent and properly respond to elder and vulner-
able-adult abuse. I developed working relationships with a
handful of nurses and doctors, in particular Laura Mosqueda,
M.D., a wonderful geriatrician at the Keck School of Medicine
and one of the leading experts on the medical aspects of elder
abuse and neglect. Very slowly, the cases began to trickle in.
As I acquainted myself with actual cases of neglect, the bar-
riers to prosecuting them quickly came into view. In most of
my early cases, there were serious failures not only of the indi-
vidual caregivers, but of the system as a whole. Rather than
one person being responsible for the neglect, there were
numerous people or agencies who had contributed to it. In one
death case I handled, the state agency that oversaw the quad-
riplegic victim’s care failed to take action despite clear signs he
was no longer leaving the house, was severely underweight,
and had a foster mother who herself appeared to be ailing. In
that case, the victim’s doctors had also done nothing when his
foster mother stopped taking him to his appointments. He died
weighing fewer than 40 pounds. In another case, the nurse
hired by the state to examine the bedbound quadriplegic vic-
tim simply asked the caregivers how she was doing rather than
examining the victim herself. When the caregivers said she was
doing fine, the nurse simply checked the boxes on her form as
if she had examined the patient herself. A few weeks later, the
victim ended up in the emergency room with massive pressure
sores on her knees; she died a few months later. In another
case, APS had closed their case after the alleged victim of
neglect, an elderly woman with probable dementia, refused to
be evaluated. She was later found dead, lying in filth, with
maggots consuming her lower extremities. Because these early
cases involved such significant failures of the system as well as
the individual caregivers, rarely could I file charges. Besides
being unethical, such prosecutions would likely have resulted
in not-guilty verdicts.
As the months passed, law enforcement, APS, and the pub-
lic became more aware of my office’s interest in these cases.
Reports increased and investigations improved. I eventually
expanded my practice to bring in cases of financial exploita-
tion, a form of elder abuse with which we have much greater
success in prosecuting. Eventually, my current boss, King
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County Prosecuting Attorney Dan Satterberg, appointed a sec-
ond prosecutor to handle the office’s elder-abuse cases. Now,
16 years later, we have never been busier.
Over the years, I have come to learn that what makes a case
of serious physical neglect potentially criminal: multiple,
severe untreated or improperly treated pressure sores com-
bined with other physical signs of poor care; a treating physi-
cian or medical expert who is of the clear opinion that the vic-
tim’s symptoms are due to neglect versus underlying disease; a
caregiver, whether paid or unpaid, who is unambiguously
responsible for the victim’s care; and a financial motive for the
caregiver to neglect the victim, such as hastening the victim’s
death to speed up an inheritance or keeping the victim in the
home to continue to have access to her income. 
At the heart of most cases of elder abuse is the issue of cog-
nitive capacity. The defense most often raised is consent—that
the victim wanted to give her money to the suspect, agreed to
the sexual act, or, in the case of neglect, refused medical care.
For us to determine whether the victim truly did consent, we
must answer the question of whether he or she had capacity to
do so. Obviously, if so, and if the consent was knowingly and
freely given, then, no matter how much we don’t like the deci-
sion to consent, we have no criminal case. 
Our first task in a case where consent is likely to be raised
is to look at what evidence we have of the victim’s mental
capacity at the time of the incident. This can be challenging,
because we often don’t receive these cases until months or even
years after the crime has occurred—often, the victim is
severely demented or dead. Records from the victim’s primary-
care provider are essential. Sometimes these records show a
well-documented history of dementia with thorough testing to
back it up. More often, however, they don’t. 
This is true for a number of reasons. One is that most peo-
ple suffering from dementia don’t know it and thus don’t com-
plain about it to their doctor. Even when patients do complain
of memory loss, health-care providers often conduct insuffi-
cient screening for it. The most common screening tool we see
implemented by doctors is the Mini-Mental State Examination,
a short test that assesses for memory loss but not for the loss
of judgment that so often accompanies early dementia. In
many of our cases, victims of financial exploitation who have
given away their life savings to someone they barely know have
scored well on this test. Only when they were given other tests
that include assessment of executive function, such as the St.
Louis University Mental Status test (SLUMS), the Montreal
Cognitive Assessment (MOCA), or the Frontal Assessment
Battery, was their impairment revealed. Perhaps another disin-
centive for doctors to conduct thorough testing is the lack of
viable treatment and cure for this awful disease. Whatever the
explanation, it’s a rare case we receive where a primary-care
provider has done a thorough work-up of the victim’s cognitive
impairment.
When we are without good medical evidence, we instruct
law enforcement to obtain a capacity evaluation of the victim.
In Seattle, we are blessed with geriatric psychologists and
social workers with experience in conducting capacity evalua-
tions at a reasonable cost. However, prosecutors in many—if
not most—other jurisdictions have no one to turn to for such
an evaluation. Often, they will rely entirely on the records of
the primary-care provider. So if that provider has failed to rec-
ognize that a patient is suffering from dementia, the prosecu-
tor is likely to interpret those records to mean that the patient
had cognitive capacity and, thus, that he or she consented to
the act that’s at issue.
Cases of elder abuse almost always require a multidiscipli-
nary response. Capacity evaluators are crucial partners to the
criminal-justice system, as are APS workers, advocates, civil
attorneys, forensic accountants, and geriatricians. We need APS
and advocates to address the victim’s many service needs after
the abuse, neglect, or exploitation is uncovered and civil attor-
neys to help them with their legal needs. We need forensic
accountants to help us sort through and analyze the stacks of
financial records that often make up these cases. This is true
even in some of the neglect and abuse cases we bring, as finan-
cial exploitation is often co-occurring or financial gain is the
perpetrator’s motive. We need geriatricians to help us determine
whether the victim’s injuries were due to the intentional actions
of a perpetrator versus a fall or underlying disease process. 
Even in my relatively resource-rich jurisdiction, it is the
unusual case of elder abuse that is actually reported, investi-
gated, and prosecuted. One recent study found that for every
one case of abuse that comes to light, another 23 do not.2
Financial exploitation is reported even less often, and neglect
even less than that. I am not an advocate of prosecution for
every one of these cases. Some of the less serious ones may be
better handled by APS or family members through the use of
civil legal tools like protection orders or powers of attorney, by
offering treatment to the perpetrator, or simply by reducing the
elder’s isolation, connecting him or her with social services or
financial monitoring or both. This is particularly true in cases
of financial exploitation when the victim wasn’t substantially
harmed and the perpetrator is a family member, someone with
whom the victim wants to continue to have a relationship. In
so many of our cases, the victim is widowed with few if any
friends or family members left, so cutting the perpetrator com-
pletely out of the victim’s life could isolate and traumatize him
or her even further. 
But because we handle felonies, the cases of mild abuse,
neglect, and exploitation are ones we rarely see. Our neglect
cases are serious, the victim usually dead. Our financial cases
most often involve a victim who is depressed and deeply
ashamed, having lost an entire life savings to someone who
was deeply trusted. Our physical-abuse cases involve serious
injuries, sometimes homicides. And our sexual abuse cases are
usually rapes, most often involving victims with advanced
dementia. The victims are male and female, from all ethnicities
and socioeconomic brackets. The qualities they tend to share
are dementia and social isolation. 
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I have been working on elder-abuse issues for 15 years now.
Though the grimness of the cases remains the same, we have
made some progress. Thanks to a small grant program of the
Office of Violence Against Women, there are now dozens of
dedicated elder-abuse prosecutors and detectives across the
country. The program funds a national prosecutor’s course and
a judicial training on elder abuse, not to mention local train-
ings for law enforcement and direct service providers. Federal
funding for research and assistance to local prosecutors and
law enforcement is increasing somewhat. There is more and
better media coverage and public awareness of the issue,
resulting in increased reporting, and, in some jurisdictions,
better responses to those reports. 
With any luck, judges across jurisdictions will see an
increasing number of these cases in the coming years. It’s cru-
cial that judges learn about dementia and cognitive impair-
ment, including the fact that older adults whose memories are
fairly intact and who may be competent to testify may never-
theless suffer from significant deficits in their executive func-
tion, which controls their ability to make good decisions for
themselves— their judgment. Judges need to know about the
various capacity-screening tools and what they can—and can-
not—tell us about a person’s cognitive status. 
It’s similarly crucial that judges be made aware of the dam-
age that can be done to these cases—and to these victims—
when cases are allowed to languish. It’s important for judges to
be given information on how much is at stake for elder-abuse
victims themselves—the shame they may feel at the fact of
their victimization, their legitimate fear that its airing could
result in loss of their independence or their home, their fre-
quent belief that cooperating with the justice system against
someone they love will result in that relationship forever being
severed. Elder abuse needs to become a standard part of judi-
cial training.
We are finally making a small degree of headway on this
complex and devastating problem, but we need to make so
much more. We need to fund more research, prevention, train-
ing, multidisciplinary teams, dedicated detectives and prose-
cutors, public-awareness campaigns, and services to protect
elders and reduce social isolation. If we continue at our current
pace, we will be entirely ill-equipped to handle the tsunami of
cases that is steadily making its way toward us as our popula-
tion ages. 
Page Ulrey is a Senior Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney at the King County Prosecutor’s
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County Elder Abuse Council and Criminal Mistreatment Review
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abuse prosecutor in her office’s Economic Crimes Unit, where she
specializes in the prosecution of cases of elder financial abuse and
neglect. For the past seven years, she has worked on protocol
development and been a member of the national training team on
elder-abuse investigation and prosecution for the Office on Vio-
lence Against Women. She has conducted trainings for the
National District Attorneys Association, the Office for Victims of
Crime, and the National Institute of Justice. She has testified
before the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging, has spoken
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the Department of Justice.
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5. See Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General
Comment No. 1 (2014), Article 12: Equal recognition before the
law. U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/GC/1 (adopted April 11, 2014), available
at https://documents-dd-ny.un,org/doc/UNDOC/GEBN/G14/031/
20/PDF/G1403120.pdf?OpenElement, and the Committee’s Con-
cluding Observations for a number of states that have appeared
before it, cited in Dinerstein, et al., Emerging International Prac-
tices, supra note 1, at nn. 58-64 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., the proposed National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, Uniform Guardianship, Conservatorship,
and Other Protective Arrangements Act (March 2017 draft), §
301(b). The proposed draft uniform law, which amends the exist-
ing Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act
(1997), is due to be presented to the Uniform Law Commission in
July 2017.
For a number of years now, I have been a committed advo-cate of supported decision making as an alternative toguardianship for people with intellectual disabilities.  In
writings, presentations, classes, and meetings,1 I have argued
that supported decision making is not only less restrictive than
guardianship but more consistent with principles of client-cen-
tered counseling and person-centered planning that animate
approaches to lawyering and the delivery of services to people
with intellectual disabilities.  Even the most humane and lim-
ited forms of guardianship shift decision-making focus from
the individual with a disability to his or her guardian or other
surrogate decision maker. In contrast, although the person
with an intellectual disability may get significant support from
one or more supporters, that person remains the primary deci-
sion maker in his or her life. 
In a prior article, I defined supportive decision making as
follows:
Supported decision-making can be defined as a series
of relationships, practices, arrangements, and agree-
ments, of more or less formality and intensity, designed
to assist an individual with a disability to make and com-
municate to others decisions about the individual’s life. 
. . . [S]upported decision-making [relies] on peer sup-
port (for example, ex-users of psychiatric services for
people with psycho-social disabilities), community sup-
port networks and personal assistance, so-called natural
supports (family, friends), or representatives (pursuant
to a representation agreement) to speak with, rather
than for, the individual with a disability.2
Supported decision making in one form or another has been
around for over 20 years in areas of the world such as British
Columbia, Canada, Sweden, parts of Australia, and Germany.
It has received a major boost from the adoption of the United
Nations Convention on the Right of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD), which the U.N. General Assembly adopted in Decem-
ber 2006 and entered into force on May 3, 2008.3 Article 12 of
the CRPD, “Equal recognition before the law,” provides that all
people with disabilities enjoy legal capacity, and that states
“shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons
with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising
their legal capacity.”4
But even though the U.N. Committee on the Rights of Per-
sons with Disabilities has taken the position that any form of
guardianship is inconsistent with Article 12 of the CRPD,5
almost all countries in the world, and all states in the United
States, continue to authorize it.  To be sure, guardianship law
and practice have evolved to emphasize the importance of
exploring less-restrictive alternatives to guardianship (such as
supported decision making, powers of attorney, health-care
proxies, and advance directives), as well as less-restrictive
alternatives within guardianship (preferring limited over gen-
eral or plenary guardianship), and to stress that the role of the
guardian is to seek to maximize the autonomy and self-deter-
mination of the person under guardianship.6 Not all of these
reforms have taken hold, however, and guardianship remains a
subject of intense interest for people with disabilities, older
persons, allies of both groups, academics, courts, and law-
makers, among others.
Whether one views guardianship as performing an impor-
tant and even admirable function for society, or as a necessary
evil, guardianship is here to stay, at least for now.   In my view,
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7. Because some of the stories I recount in this essay are rather per-
sonal, I am using initials in lieu of my sister’s full name.
8. As was not uncommon in the 1950s, the neurologist who treated
my sister when she was a toddler advised my parents to institu-
tionalize her, believing that it would be too hard on the rest of the
family to raise a child with an intellectual disability in the com-
munity.  Fortunately for all of us, my parents disregarded this
advice and raised my sister and me together in the family home.
9. She moved to the Rosemary Kennedy Center in 1971, four years
before enactment of the then-called Education for All Handi-
capped Children Act (now the Individuals with Disabilities Edu-
cation Act, or IDEA).  IDEA requires that students with disabili-
ties receive a free appropriate public education in the least restric-
tive environment. Were she in school today, she almost certainly
would have been in a special class in the public high school. 
10. In this essay, I use the current usage of “intellectual disability” in
lieu of the terminology of the time, “mental retardation” or “the
mentally retarded.”  People with intellectual disabilities and their
allies objected to the term “mental retardation” because of the
stigma associated with it. My sister is very aware of that stigma,
and when she loses her temper, or is angry with her housemates
or day-program companions, she is not above using it as an epi-
thet. 
11. One phrase my mother said to my sister during this period that
continues to resonate with my sister to this day was “Nobody’s
Perfect.” The phrase has allowed my sister to recognize that
although she may have problems (indeed, her variation of the
phrase is “Everyone has problems”), so does everyone else.
12. During my freshman year at Cornell University, I wrote an essay
about growing up with my sister for my Psychology 101 class.  As
I recall, the assignment was open-ended, and my choice of topic
undoubtedly reflected the importance I ascribed to my relation-
ship with my sister.
those who seek to reform guardianship make a big mistake if
they see it as a lost cause and put all of their eggs in the basket
of supported decision making and other alternatives to
guardianship.
My perspective on this issue is affected significantly by the
fact that I am the guardian for my younger sister A.D.7 (two
and one-half years younger than me), who is a person with an
intellectual disability.  Her level of intellectual disability is con-
sidered in the moderate range.  In addition, she has mild cere-
bral palsy, which affects her coordination and gait, and has dif-
ficulties in articulation that can make her speech difficult to
understand. In her early 20s she had the first of several inci-
dences of psychiatric distress, and later was diagnosed with
schizo-affective disorder, which continues to flare up from
time to time.  Although these diagnostic categories provide
some information about her, they do not come close to cap-
turing who she is as a person. They do not—and cannot—con-
vey that she has an excellent sense of humor and a remarkable
memory (which sometimes gets her into trouble, as she thinks
of incidents from 40 years ago as if they happened yesterday).
She also is extremely gullible, obsessive, and always seeking
the approval of peers and staff.  She can be extraordinarily
thoughtful and empathetic one moment, and highly focused
on herself to the exclusion of others the next. As is character-
istic of many people with intellectual disabilities, her thinking
can be highly concrete, though within the limited sphere of her
daily concerns she can be remarkably logical and clear-think-
ing.  Over the years I have learned never to take for granted
what she knows nor what she does not.
We grew up together in the family home on Long Island 8
from the mid-1950s until I went away to college in the fall of
1970.  My sister was in special classes in regular public schools
until age 16, when, because the high school did not have a
class for those in need of special education, she switched to the
Rosemary Kennedy Center, a special school within New York’s
Board of Cooperative Educational Services system.  My sister
was keenly aware of being separated from non-disabled stu-
dents9 and, indeed, would bring home notices from school
having crossed out the word “Center” on the school’s letter-
head because to her “Center” meant “Separate School for Chil-
dren with Intellectual Disabilities.”10 My parents raised my sis-
ter in as “normal” a way as they
knew how.11 We took family vaca-
tions (including a cross-country
car trip when we were 13 and 11,
respectively), went out to dinner
every Sunday night, and, in gen-
eral, lived the conventional life of
a middle-class family in 1950s and
1960s suburban America. My sis-
ter and I watched the classic 1960s
sitcoms (Andy Griffith, Danny
Thomas, Lucille Ball, The Flying Nun) and listened to the Bea-
tles, the Rolling Stones, the Beach Boys, and all of the rock-
and-roll music that WABC-AM and, later, WNEW-FM, played.
In those benighted days, when educators thought that a 16-
year-old with a “mental age” of eight should be treated as a
chronological eight-year-old, my mother marched into the
school one day to complain that playing “Here Comes Peter
Cotton Tail” to my sister’s class was rather absurd when she
(and presumably at least some of her classmates) were listen-
ing to The Beatles’ Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band album
at home.  That was the end of “Here Comes Peter Cotton Tail”
at the Rosemary Kennedy Center.
My sister and I were very close growing up. We certainly fell
into some of the patterns of older brother-younger sister rela-
tionships: she may have had an intellectual disability (for
which I not only felt sympathy but, if I am honest, some guilt
for not having a disability myself) but she could be as annoy-
ing as any younger sister. Still, I know she looked up to me
and consistently sought my approval. As I prepared to leave for
college, I wondered how my sister would adapt to my absence.
But it was I who had tears in my eyes, not her, as I got into the
car to go to school.12
Once my sister graduated from the Rosemary Kennedy Cen-
ter, in 1977 (the same year that I graduated from Yale Law
School), the rhythms of her daily life changed significantly.
During the day, rather than attend school, she went to a shel-
tered workshop in a neighboring town. For a variety of rea-
sons, the workshop was a stressful experience for her.  Increas-
ingly, my sister became emotionally dependent on my parents,
especially my mother. She had few friends and craved attention
I am the
guardian for my
younger sister
A.D., who is a
peson with an
intellectual 
disability.
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13. New Hope Community’s programs are described at newhope
community.org.  New Hope’s history, from its opening in 1975 to
the present, is presented at http://newhopecommunity.org/
our-family/a-legacy-of-trust/.  My family had, over the years,
taken several vacations in the Catskills, so the area was familiar to
my parents and my sister.
14. My parents were consistent contributors to New Hope and even-
tually joined the board of the New Hope Foundation, the fund-
raising arm of New Hope Community, Inc.  I joined the New Hope
Community, Inc. Board of Directors in March 2015 and remain on
the board currently. 
15. My parents also set up a special-needs trust for my sister, at a time
when it was far from clear that such trusts would be effective in
allowing the beneficiary to continue to receive Supplemental
Security Income, Medicaid, and other governmental benefits. 
16. Article 17-A guardianships, designed specifically for people with
intellectual disabilities, are accompanied by many fewer safe-
guards for the person for whom guardianship is sought than exist
under the general guardianship statute, N.Y. MENTAL HYG. L. § 81
(Article 81). Article 17-A has come under criticism for its lack of
due process and failure to keep up with changing practices regard-
ing the rights of people with intellectual disabilities. (The statute
was enacted in 1969.)  See Rose Mary Bailly & Charis B. Nick-
Torok, Should We Be Talking?—Beginning a Dialogue on Guardian-
ship for the Developmentally Disabled in New York, 75 ALB. L. REV.
807 (2012); Revisiting S.C.P.A. 17-A: Guardianship for People with
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities: A Report of the Mental
Health Law Committee and the Disability Law Committee of the New
York City Bar Association, 18 CUNY L. REV. 287 (2015).
from my parents.  After two years,
my parents were concerned that
my sister would never develop
the independence and confidence
she would need in adulthood if
she continued to live at home.
Having her at home was also
beginning to take a toll on their
health as they were aging.  In
1980, they moved her to a rela-
tively new program in Loch Sheldrake, New York, called New
Hope Rehabilitation Center.  The New Hope facility was on the
grounds of the former Green Acres Hotel in the Catskill Moun-
tains;13 the main living area was the former main hotel build-
ing, and the residents lived in single or double bedrooms.
Over time, New Hope (now known as New Hope Commu-
nity), led for many years by a charismatic executive director,
Daniel Berkowitz, evolved along with the field of intellectual
disabilities, and changed from a private residential school to a
community residential program. Residents like my sister
moved from the main facility to houses and apartments in the
local community.  Since the late 1980s, she has lived in four
different group homes, and currently lives with five other peo-
ple with intellectual disabilities on a cul-de-sac in a nearby
town.  Direct-care staff provide 24-hour/7-day-a-week cover-
age of the home. 
AD has always been somewhat ambivalent about living in
New Hope and the surrounding community.  She still talks
about not having liked living in the main building, which she
saw as institutional in nature.  She was very aware of the dif-
ference between living at home with her parents and brother
and living with 90 other people with intellectual disabilities in
a congregate setting.  Indeed, she took some pride in not hav-
ing come to New Hope from Willowbrook and Letchworth Vil-
lage, two notorious New York institutions for people with
intellectual disabilities (now, fortunately, closed), as a number
of New Hope residents (including her long-time boyfriend)
had.  She did not understand why she could not continue to
live at home with my parents.  It was always important to her
that she still had a home outside of New Hope.  Even though
she visited home often, and my parents came to visit her fre-
quently (New Hope was about two and one-half hours by car
from their home), she expressed her ambivalence by, among
other things, insisting that she keep her extensive record col-
lection in the family home, as if bringing the records up to
New Hope would somehow communicate her abandonment of
home.14
In 1985, about five years after my parents placed my sister
in New Hope, they consulted a lawyer about the steps they
needed to take to protect my sister’s personal and financial
interests. Among other things,15 the lawyer suggested that my
parents become my sister’s co-guardians, pursuant to Surro-
gate’s Court Procedure Act, Article 17-A.16 I was named my
sister’s standby guardian in case my parents were unable to
serve as her guardians. The transition from being parents of a
minor child to being guardians for an adult with an intellectual
disability did not seem difficult for them (though her contin-
ued expressions of wanting to come home certainly tore at
them emotionally).  It was rather a continuation of the rela-
tionship with my sister that they always had. Indeed, from the
time my sister went to New Hope until my mother’s death, my
mother (and often my father) and sister spoke by telephone
approximately five days a week.
Because this is an essay about being a supportive guardian,
and not a biography of my sister, I will pass over the years
between 1985, when she became subject to guardianship, and
2007, when our mother passed away suddenly. Our father was
still alive but was suffering from advanced dementia, so he was
in no condition to function as my sister’s guardian.  I took over
as standby guardian and then, after our father’s death in 2008,
retained a lawyer who represented me in my petition to
become my sister’s guardian. I discussed the nature of the pro-
ceedings with my sister (who was represented by her own
counsel), explaining that I was seeking to become her guardian
so that I could help her make decisions.  I was very proud of
her when, at the conclusion of the rather pro forma hearing,
the judge asked her if she had anything to say, and she said, “I
want my brother to help me make decisions.” The court
granted the petition and I became my sister’s guardian in 2009.
I did not seriously consider refraining from petitioning to
become my sister’s guardian. My lawyer recommended that I
become her guardian (it seemed to her to be an almost auto-
matic decision) but I knew enough to know that I could have
sought an alternative such as supported decision making.  But
because my sister had been under my parents’ guardianship for
almost 25 years, and I had already functioned as a standby
She did not 
understand why
she could not 
continue to live 
at home with 
my parents.
76 Court Review - Volume 53 
17. I have worked in the field of disability-rights law since 1977. After
serving as a trial lawyer in the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil
Rights Division, Special Litigation Section, from 1977 to 1982, I
left for a clinical teaching position at American University, Wash-
ington College of Law, where I still teach.  I have taught a disabil-
ity-rights seminar since 1985 and, since 2005, have directed the
law school’s Disability Rights Law Clinic, which I founded. From
1994 to 2000, I served on the President’s Committee on Mental
Retardation, now called the President’s Committee on People with
Intellectual Disabilities.
18. Compare the very detailed and restrictive rules for visitation
adopted by the parent and step-parent of Jenny Hatch (who were
serving as temporary guardians) in Ross & Ross v. Hatch, Case No.
CWF-120000-426-P-03 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2013). I testified as an expert
witness in the case in favor of supported decision making as an
alternative to guardianship for Ms. Hatch. The court rejected the
parent and step-parent’s petition for guardianship and instead
appointed two friends of Jenny’s as temporary co-guardians for
one year with the explicit of goal of preparing Jenny for supported
decision making after one year.  The Jenny Hatch case has spurred
much commentary and was instrumental in establishing the
National Resource Center for Supported Decision-Making,
http://www.supporteddecisionmaking.org/.
19. I have written about client-centered counseling in Robert D. Din-
erstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32
ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990), and other publications.
20. One of several examples: my sister has told me she does not like
to drink milk because, as she puts it, “Mom says it doesn’t agree
with her.”  I can hear my mother saying that.  I tell my sister that
our mother was a wonderful woman but that my sister can make
her own choices.  She has not taken up drinking milk, however.
21. STEPHEN ELLMANN, ROBERT D. DINERSTEIN, ISABELLE R. GUNNING,
KATHERINE R. KRUSE, & ANN C. SHALLECK, LAWYERS AND CLIENTS:
CRITICAL ISSUES IN INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 23 (2009).
22. Unlike my parents, I am unable to speak daily with my sister but
I do speak to her about two or three times a week.
guardian, I thought that continuing the guardianship was the
right option. I also knew, or hoped, that I would not function
as an overbearing guardian but rather as a supportive one.
As our parents’ health had deteriorated in the years before
their deaths, I took more of an “official” role in my sister’s life
at New Hope.  I made sure I attended New Hope’s annual fam-
ily barbeque, even though its timing frequently conflicted with
my law-teaching schedule.  I had always reviewed my sister’s
annual individual habilitation or support plans (the names
have changed over the years) but started attending her semi-
annual meetings.  But although my parents had often con-
sulted with me over the years regarding my sister’s situation,17
I was not legally responsible for her decisions until I became
her guardian.  I had to consider what kind of guardian I
wanted to be, and, more importantly, what kind of guardian
my sister needed for me to be. 
In the stories that follow, I want to illustrate some of the
ways in which my sister and I interact and how that affects the
way I see my role as her guardian.  To be honest, it is very dif-
ficult for me to distinguish my role as her older brother from
my role as her guardian. Other than signing off on her annual
flu shots, and approving her yearly behavioral support and
programming plans, I am not sure that my status as her
guardian makes any difference in her day-to-day life.  Because
I do not live with my sister and cannot visit easily (she lives
about a six-hour car ride away from me), I could not exercise
control over her day-to-day life18 even if I wanted to, which I
do not.
I also have thought a great deal about how my relationship
with my sister differs from that of my parents with her. My par-
ents were not shy about telling my sister what to do when she
had questions, or even when she did not.  (They sometimes
tried to do this with me, but with less success.)  That is not my
style. Consistent with my commitment to client-centered
counseling,19 I do not believe in telling my sister what to do,
but rather try to help her understand her choices and their
consequences.  Some of the most interesting interchanges I
have had with my sister involve her telling me that our mother
thought something in particular and my telling my sister that
she could make a different decision.20 Her response in these
situations—“Really?”—reflects
how difficult it can be for peo-
ple with intellectual disabilities
to really believe they have the
right to make their own
choices, no matter what others
have said to them.  
I have organized the stories
that follow around a series of
themes that I hope will illus-
trate some of the challenges
(and joys) of serving as my sister’s guardian.
1. The importance of listening—what does the person
under guardianship really want or mean?
Listening carefully to someone—whether a client or a loved
one—is not only an important interpersonal quality but a crit-
ical lawyering skill.21 Listening is no less an important skill for
a guardian.  What I have learned as my sister’s guardian is to
listen not only to what she says, but to what she does not. 
Several years ago, A.D. told me over the telephone22 that a
friend had invited her to a birthday party but that she was not
sure she should go. My sister can have challenges in relating to
other peers so I thought it was a good sign that a friend had
invited her to her party. I asked her why she did not think she
should go, and at first she said, “I don’t know.”  After I asked
again, she said, “Well, I am not sure she really invited me.” I
pursued the matter and asked her how she had been invited
(the friend had asked her) and tried to reassure her that unless
the friend had withdrawn the invitation, she could assume that
the invitation still stood. My sister still was skeptical.  Some
instinct made me ask her, “Is there some other reason why you
don’t want to go?”  She answered, “Well, yes.  Linda lives on
the second floor of her house.”  I said, “So you are concerned
that you would have to go up the stairs to get to her apart-
ment?” She said yes.  Even though my sister can climb stairs,
the unsteadiness of her gait makes her lack confidence when
climbing or descending stairs.  I reassured her that (1) she
could in fact climb the stairs if she took her time; (2) staff
would assist her, so that she would not fall; and (3) because it
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23. My sister is quite aware that she can be difficult to understand.
Although I can figure out almost all of her speech, there are some
times when I cannot. She has a remarkable capacity to provide an
analogy or alternative terminology that will assist me in under-
standing her. For example, one time she was trying to tell me
something about someone named Lawrence, but I could not
understand her. She tried a few more times and then said, “You
know, Lawrence, like Steve Lawrence and Eydie Gormé.” It helps
to know what her cultural references are.
24. Most of my friends and colleagues call me Bob.  When my sister
was very young and had trouble pronouncing my name she called
me Bobby but as she got older she switched to Robert, which is
what my parents called me.  It can be a bit confusing for staff
when I call because AD’s boyfriend is also named Robert.
was the summer time, it was
possible that the party would be
outside and would not involve
her having to climb the stairs.
At that point, my sister said she
would go to the party.
Someone with greater cogni-
tive capacity might have been
able to say from the beginning why she was uncomfortable
going to the party.  But that was not—and generally is not—my
sister’s way.  It may be that she is not adept at weighing the pros
and cons of a particular decision without being prompted. Or
she may have thought at some level that her reason for not
attending the party would not stand up to scrutiny.  Either way,
if I had just taken her answer at face value, she might well have
not attended the party and missed out on a pleasurable experi-
ence.
Shortly after our mother’s death, one of the first medical
consent issues that arose with respect to my sister concerned
whether she should have a colonoscopy.  When my sister
turned 50, New Hope staff approached our mother about con-
senting to the procedure, which was being proposed as stan-
dard preventive treatment. Mom declined to give consent,
apparently because she did not believe the procedure was nec-
essary and might be difficult for my sister. I was aware of my
mother’s decision, and urged her to reconsider, but she did not
change her mind. After I became guardian, the staff
approached me about approving the procedure.  My perspec-
tive differed from that of my mother: I had had a colonoscopy
at 50 (which in fact revealed a condition that now requires
more frequent follow-up) and thought it made sense for my
sister to have one as well.  But even though I had the author-
ity simply to approve the procedure, I did not want to do so
without discussing it with my sister.
I first explained that the doctor wanted to perform a
colonoscopy. As I wrote earlier, my sister can have difficulty
with articulation,23 and “colonoscopy” can be a difficult word
to pronounce for people with typical pronunciation ability.
More challenging was trying to explain what the procedure
was.  As is my practice, I tried to be accurate without being too
technical in my language. I told her that it was a procedure
where the doctor looked inside to see how her intestines—
where food goes after leaving the stomach—were doing.  She
said, “I don’t want to have it.”  Shamelessly playing the older
brother card, I told her that I had had a colonoscopy and that
it was not too bad. Still she resisted.  Again I asked her, “Is
there some reason you don’t want a colonoscopy?”  She said, “I
just don’t like needles.”  She apparently associated visits to the
doctor with injections, and she was not about to put herself
through that unless she was required to do so.
Well, now I had my opening.  The dialogue went something
like the following:
Robert24: OK. So there’s some good news and some bad
news.  Which do you want to hear first?
A.D.: The good news.
Robert: OK, the good news is that there is no needle in
the procedure.  And it is not painful at all, espe-
cially on the day you have it.
A.D.: Good.
Robert: Now for the bad news.
A.D.: OK.
Robert: The day before the colonoscopy, you won’t be able
to eat your regular meals. You’ll only be able to
have liquids and you are going to have to go to
the bathroom a lot to clean yourself out. You’ll be
miserable, but it won’t hurt.
A.D.: OK, I’ll do it.
And, indeed, she had the colonoscopy.
As with attending the party, my sister was not about to dis-
close at first the underlying premise of her thinking.  But as
was true in that case, once given more information, she was
able to make a reasoned decision.  I was prepared to forgo the
procedure had she continued to object; absent an emergency
or serious medical situation, I would not exercise my author-
ity as her guardian to override her decision.
I have written that my sister and I speak frequently on the
telephone.  Our conversations (from her end) are mostly about
what she had to eat, whether she had gone to either the Dollar
Tree Store or Walmart, whether she had seen her boyfriend,
what movie she saw at her day program, and similar issues. She
will ask me how I am doing, how my wife and grown sons are
doing, and when I will next be coming up to visit her. The sub-
ject matter of the conversations is unremarkable but they allow
her (and me) to maintain an important connection.  My sister
is uncomfortable ending the conversation, no matter how
repetitive it might become.  What I learned, though, is that
when she asks, “What else do you want to talk about?,” it is
her signal that she has no more to say.  But it is up to me to say,
“Well, maybe we should say good-bye and we’ll talk again next
time.”  She never objects, but if I did not take the initiative we
would probably still be on the telephone.
What these interactions suggest, I submit, is that the
guardian has to know the person for whom he is serving as
guardian extraordinarily well. He or she has to listen to the per-
son carefully and focus on what is not said as well as what is
said. I do not pretend to be able to understand perfectly my sis-
ter’s true desires or choices. But if I approach her in a true mode
of inquiry and humility, I can get it right most of the time.
[O]nce given
more information,
she was able to
make a reasoned
decision.
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25. Another quality of my sister is that, although she is not above
making up things when it serves her interests, she is almost a
compulsive truth-teller.  A more strategic person might have kept
from the staff that she had had a second diet soda that day. (I was
not about to rat her out.)  However, as soon as we arrived at her
home, she told the staff on duty that she had a second soda. The
staff assured her that it was OK that she had had the second soda
(at least in the company of her family).
2. The power of a person’s will—agreement is not always
what it seems
People with disabilities are often in situations in which they
believe they have to agree to something for fear of displeasing
someone with power over them, whether it is a staff person or
a family member (or a guardian). I have learned that my sister
sometimes appears to agree to a course of action only to under-
mine it, or take advantage of a chink in the armor of the deci-
sion-making process.
A.D. loves drinking soda. It is one of the supreme pleasures
in her life.  Some years ago, staff persuaded her to drink diet
soda, but they still try to get her to limit her intake. Over the
years, they have tried to come up with different rules about
how much soda she should drink. The staff tries to negotiate
these rules with my sister, who appears to agree with them. She
will call me and say something like, “New Hope says I can have
one diet soda a day. Is that OK with you?” I don’t really care
whether this particular rule is the best one for her, but if the
staff have proposed it and she has agreed, I am happy to go
along with it. (I certainly would intervene if I thought the pro-
posed rule or guideline was unreasonable or overly restrictive.)
What I do know is that my sister (apparently) likes rules and
that a response such as “You can do what you want,” would
not satisfy her.
But the human will is powerful and my sister is quite capa-
ble of undermining the rules, or her prior acquiescence to
them, when it suits her.  I recall the time that we were having
dinner at the Liberty Diner, her favorite restaurant. The dinner
occurred during a period when she was trying to limit herself
to drink no more than one diet soda a day. Earlier that day she
had had a diet soda at lunch so as we sat down in the booth,
and before we ordered, we discussed whether she should have
a diet soda with dinner. She volunteered that since she had had
a diet soda at lunch she would not have one at dinner. I was
pleased that she was able to understand “the rules” and plan
her behavior to conform to them. 
The waitress came to our table to take our drink orders. To
be honest, I would have liked to have a diet soda myself, but I
was not going to order one when my sister was abstaining.  So
I told the waitress that water would be fine for me. The wait-
ress, who knew my sister, turned to her, and, without waiting
for her order, said “Do you want a diet Coke, hon?”  My sister’s
eyes lit up as if she had just been released from custody—she
immediately answered yes, and then looked over at me, tri-
umphantly, as if to say, “Just try to enforce the rule now.”  We
laughed at what was now clearly an amendment to the rule: no
more than one diet soda per day unless the waiter or waitress
offers you one.25
More recently, and more seriously, at her annual meeting
A.D. expressed concerns about the day program she attends.
Her service coordinator suggested that she might like a differ-
ent program, and proposed that she might visit that program to
see if she preferred it. As the meeting proceeded, A.D. seemed
to back off of her criticisms of
the existing program. She said
she might not like the new pro-
gram. She didn’t want to disap-
point the people in the current
program. She clearly had some
ambivalence, even though the
team (including me) assured
her that visiting the program
did not mean that she had to
move if she did not want to do
so. She agreed to visit the new proposed program.
Not two days later, however, she told her house manager in
no uncertain terms that she did not want to visit the new pro-
gram and would stay at the existing program.  For all of her
criticisms (including of past programs or her residence), she is
averse to making changes in her life.  As noted, she does not
want to disappoint people, even when they reassure her that
no one will criticize her if she makes the proposed change.  But
it also might be that because she has difficulty articulating, let
alone weighing, the pros and cons of a particular situation
(e.g., “I like aspect x of the workshop but do not like aspect y),
it is only when a change becomes concrete that she really
examines whether, all things considered, a change is what she
wants.  For now, she remains in the current program.
My sister can be very insightful but is not above taking
advantage of a situation when it suits her.  At one of the first
annual meetings I attended, when she had just moved to a new
house (not the one in which she currently lives), the staff per-
son leading the meeting asked her a series of questions about
her experience at the home. We all sat around a long dining-
room table. Other than A.D. and me, everyone else at the meet-
ing was a staff person: direct care staff, house manager, nurse,
service coordinator, and clinician.  There were about 20 people
around the table, and I wondered whether A.D. would be
intimidated by their being so many staff there.  I need not have
worried. The service coordinator initiated the following dia-
logue with her:
Service 
coordinator: A.D., you can choose the clothes you wear
each day. Are you doing that?
A.D.: No, the staff does that for me.
Service 
coordinator: A.D., you can make your lunch each day
before you go to your program.  Are you
doing that?
A.D.: No, the staff does that for me.
[I look around the room and notice that the direct-care staff
is looking somewhat uncomfortable]
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26. As defined in D.C. CODE § 21-2011 (25A): “‘Substituted judgment’
means making a decision that conforms as closely as possible with
the decision that the individual would have made based upon the
knowledge of the beliefs, values, and preferences of the individual.” 
27. See Committee on Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General
Comment No. 1, supra note 5, at 5, ¶21.
Service 
coordinator: A.D., you
can gather
your laundry
and put it in
the washing
machine. Are
you doing
that?
A.D.: No, the staff
does that.
Service 
coordinator: But A.D., 
you were 
doing all of these things at your prior house.
Why aren’t you doing them here?
A.D.: [Smiling and looking triumphant]: Because I
am a guest here.
The group cracked up (as did A.D., who appreciated the
apparent absurdity of the situation).  But although the staff was
appropriately trying to foster her independence, and while I
was fully in support of this goal, A.D. was not above getting
other people to do things for her if they were willing to do
them.  I am sure the service coordinator had a conversation
with the direct-care staff after the meeting, but for one
moment, at least, A.D. was able to assert her independence,
ironically by being willing to take advantage of her depen-
dency. Was it in her best interest not to do things for herself
when she could do so?  I don’t know, but the sense of agency
she had by being defiant was priceless.
3. Seeking validation rather than a decision: difficult—
and not so difficult—conversations
Guardians struggle (or should) with what criteria they
should use in making decisions for the person for whom they
serve as guardian.  Many guardianship statutes urge or even
require the guardian to use the substituted-judgment standard:
that is, the guardian should make the decision the person
under guardianship would make if he or she was able to decide
(or was able to communicate his or her decision).26 The stan-
dard of decision making for supporters in a supported deci-
sion-making regime, when the person is unable to communi-
cate a decision, is to give the best interpretation of the person’s
will and preferences.27 Both standards require the decision
maker to ascertain what the person would want to do and then
seek to implement the decision.
In my experience with my sister, the bifurcation of decision
making between guardian and person under guardianship does
not always capture the actual decision-making process at
work.  Sometimes my sister wants me to make a decision for
her (no matter how much I emphasize that it is her decision to
make). Other times, she is not looking to me so much for a
decision as validation for a decision she wants to make, or, in
fact, has already made. One story illustrates this point.
I’ve already noted that the Liberty Diner is my sister’s
favorite restaurant.  Left to her own devices, I believe she
would almost always choose to eat there whenever my wife
and I, or I alone, come up to visit her. She also often chooses
to go there for lunch or dinner with her boyfriend, accompa-
nied by staff who, I have learned, are not always so eager to eat
there.  I am happy to eat at the Liberty Diner but I also am
happy to eat elsewhere if she wants to go to another restaurant.
More than once, as we’ve prepared to go to lunch after one
of her meetings, she will ask me, “Where do you want to go to
eat?”  I will respond, “Wherever you want. It’s your choice.”
Most times she will answer, “Let’s go to Liberty Diner,” and we
will go there. But every once in a while she will say, “Maybe we
should go somewhere else.”  I will say,”That’s fine with me.
Where do you want to go?” She’ll say, “How about Pizza Hut
(which is right next to the Liberty Diner)?” and I will say “OK.
Let’s go to Pizza Hut.”  But as we are on our way to Pizza Hut,
she’ll start reconsidering her decision. “Maybe we should go to
Liberty Diner.” I will say, “We can go wherever you want to
go.”  She will then say, “Where do you want to go?” and I am
likely to respond, “It’s your choice.”  We could go on like this
for a long time, and sometimes have.
What I have come to realize, though, is that sometimes she
wants me to make the decision for her. I think if I made a deci-
sion with which she did not agree, she would certainly express
her disagreement or otherwise resist the choice. But if I say to
her something like, “We can go anywhere you like, but I am
thinking that you want to go to Liberty Diner. We can go
there,” she will readily agree, especially if I add, “We can go to
Pizza Hut next time if you like.” That seems to satisfy her need
to keep options open while at the same time going to the
restaurant at which she really wants to eat. If I make the deci-
sion for her in this way, am I overstepping my bounds and
undermining her autonomy? Or am I in fact honoring her
autonomous choice to let someone else (someone she trusts)
make a decision for her, as long as she can object?
4. Helping my sister figure out what others mean and
serving as her advocate
Often my role as guardian/brother is to help my sister
understand language or situations to which she is exposed. I
do not always know what she understands, and I have learned
that a combination of questions and clarifications can assist
her in living her life more or less the way she wants.
As I have noted, my sister likes to talk, and often is frus-
trated when others are not interested in talking with her.  She
loves to talk about the food she had at prior meals, but does
not understand why others may not be that interested in what
she has eaten.  Over time, I have suggested some topics she
might raise with her peers or with staff—she could ask them
about their families, what staff do on weekends, what sports or
music they like, which presidential candidate they like, or
about other issues that appear on the news.  Sometimes these
[T]he bifurcation of
decision making
between guardian
and person under
guardianship does
not always 
capture the actual
decision-making
process at work.
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28. Some staff do not like talking with her about their private lives,
seeking to limit their interactions to those related to their job.
Although this desire is understandable on their part, it is frustrat-
ing to my sister who thinks of the staff as her friends, at least for
certain purposes.
29. For many years, I served on the board of directors of the Quality
Trust for Individuals with Disabilities, Inc., in Washington, D.C.
One of our board members was a self-advocate (a person with an
intellectual disability) who periodically would complain about
others’ use of the word “individual” to describe people with dis-
abilities. One time I asked him why he reacted so negatively to a
word that most people saw as at least neutral if not respectful
when used to describe someone.  He said that in his experience,
when staff from the local developmental disabilities services
agency interacted with him and others they only used the word
“individual” to refer to people with disabilities receiving services,
whereas they used different words to describe others.  For this
colleague, “individual” connoted a person who receives services,
and he was offended by the term.  Context is everything. 
suggestions are successful but she still complains that not
everyone wants to talk about these topics.28
One time I tried a different tack with her. I explained that in
successful conversations, the person asks the other person in
the conversation what he or she is interested in.  My sister
thought for a moment and said, “But I am not interested in
what they want to talk about.” “Well, that may be your prob-
lem—unless you show interest in what the other person wants
to talk about, the other person probably will not be interested
in your topics.”  That seemed like such a basic point but her
reaction to my statement suggested that she did not really
know the “rules” of conversation and now had to consider a
different approach to interacting with others.
A.D. has a keen ear for language and sometimes has strong
reactions to terms that she thinks are pejorative, even when
they may not necessarily be intended negatively.  But I have
learned that sometimes her instinct about the negative intent
is pretty close to the mark.
For example, one of her housemates, noting A.D.’s desire to
talk a lot, called her a “chatterbox.”  I know this housemate is
very fond of A.D. and is always looking out for her. I don’t
think she meant “chatterbox” to be a negative description. But
apparently my sister thought that she was being criticized for
being too talkative, and she resented the use of the term.  No
amount of discussion about the relative harmlessness of the
term has satisfied her, though she continues to have a good
relationship with this housemate—as long as she does not use
the term again.  She also objects to the use of the word “behav-
ior.”  I have explained that behavior can be a neutral word
describing how one is acting, but she associates it with “nega-
tive behaviors” or with actions that need to be addressed. In
this case, her insight seems correct, and because she associates
the term with a negative judgment about her, she reacts vis-
cerally to it, even when it is not being used negatively. 29
One of the reasons I think it is important that I attend every
semi-annual meeting of my sister’s interdisciplinary team is
that I see my role as her advocate as well as wanting to help her
understand why things are the way they are. One time, we
were at a meeting and the nurse was recounting for my sister
all of the medical visits she had had in the prior six months.
The language was fairly technical; the nurse would say, “You
went to see your psychiatrist and she reviewed your medica-
tions. You saw the neurologist and he conducted x, y, and z
tests. You went to the cardiologist and he conducted an elec-
trocardiogram.”
At this point, I intervened and said that I was having some
difficulty in understanding all of these technical terms and I
was pretty sure A.D. did not
understand them either. I
turned to her and asked her if
she was following the conversa-
tion, and she said cheerfully,
“No.” I then said to the nurse
that if she used less technical
language my sister might be
able to understand her and par-
ticipate more fully in the meet-
ing. So rather than describing
the above visit to the cardiologist as she had, if the nurse had
said, “AD, you went to the heart doctor and he connected all
these wires to you, which were connected to a machine that
made squiggly lines,” she would remember the visit.
The nurse thanked me for the intervention and promised
to use less technical language. Things improved for a bit, but,
sure enough, she lapsed back into medical jargon, indicating
that my sister had seen the OB/GYN who had indicated that
she was beginning to develop signs of osteoporosis.  I was
just about to intervene again and ask that she use plain lan-
guage when my sister perked up and said, “Oh, you mean
like Sally Field?”  My sister, an inveterate consumer of tele-
vision shows and commercials, recalled that the actress had
been on a commercial dealing with a product that addressed
osteoporosis.  If nothing else, her ability to make this con-
nection showed that she really was listening and trying to fol-
low the conversation. 
As I noted above, it is within the medical sphere that my
role as guardian, as opposed to brother, seems clearest, and
being my sister’s guardian makes it easier for medical profes-
sionals to speak with me about her care.  Here, I try to
approach medical decisions as I would when inquiring about
my own medical needs or those of a loved one (which, of
course, she is).  For example, a few years ago, the house staff
told me that my sister’s gastroenterologist wanted to perform
another colonoscopy and needed my consent.  I told the staff
that I was surprised the doctor was seeking to perform this
procedure since my sister’s prior one had been only five years
earlier, and as I understood the protocol she would not be due
for another for another five years.  It took a few days but the
gastroenterologist finally reached me and explained what he
wanted to do. I asked him why he was asking to do a
colonoscopy on my sister after only five years. He said that
when they do not have a history they like to do the procedure
sooner than ten years apart. I asked why the New Hope staff
had not provided him with a history, or, if they had not, why
. . . I see my role
as an advocate as
well as wanting
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30. Sometimes we will speak by phone on a Thursday and she will ask
me, “Can you come over tomorrow?” When she first asked me
that question I would point out that, as she knew, I lived about six
hours away from her and could not just come over to see her as if
I lived nearby.  I wondered whether she did not realize that I lived
far away. Over time, though, I came to realize that her question
was another way of saying that she missed me and wished that I
lived closer to her, knowing very well that I did not. 
31. Over the course of several months, she would ask me whether x
or y celebrity was still alive.  These actors or singers were often
people who were performing in the 1960s. Sometimes I knew the
person was dead or alive, and I would tell her what I knew. Other
times, my wife would check the Internet while I was speaking
with my sister so I could give her accurate information. 
he or someone on his staff had
not contacted me to provide the
necessary family history. I asked
him whether my sister’s prior
colonoscopy had turned up any
problems that would have sug-
gested the need for an early
colonoscopy and, after reviewing
her records, he said there were
none. We agreed that she did not
need a colonoscopy for another
five years.
It would have been an easy
matter to approve the colonoscopy, which, while unpleasant
(as discussed above), was not a dangerous procedure. But just
as I would not accept uncritically my own doctor’s suggestion
of such a procedure for myself, I was not about to consent to it
for my sister.  More recently, my sister’s psychiatrist wanted to
change one of her psychotropic medications. Again, as my sis-
ter’s guardian, my consent was needed. Because it was, I was
able to speak with the psychiatrist and satisfy myself that he
had thought through his recommendation carefully. 
5. A person under guardianship does not always get to
have things her way—we all live within constraints
As noted above, the substituted-judgment standard, while
an important principle of decision making, cannot provide
answers to all of the situations that guardians and the people
under guardianship face.  If you asked my sister where she
would like to live, her choice would be to live with my wife
and me. We probably have the conversation about once every
month or two. If I saw my role as implementing her decision
about where she wants to live, I would have her move in with
me. I understand emotionally why she wants to live with me;
now that our parents have passed away, my home is really the
only other home she has.  Even though on balance she is
happy where she lives, she gets frustrated with not having
other options if she were to decide she did not like New Hope
any more.
I always try to be straight with my sister, and not give her
false hope or suggest she has choices when she does not.  I
have learned that she can take disappointment, as we all must,
as long as she can continue to raise an issue of concern.  
One of our conversations about her desire to live with me
reflects both her ongoing desire and, notwithstanding her
intellectual disability, her intelligence:
A.D.: Robert, can I come live with you?
Robert: A.D., you know that’s not realistic.
A.D.: Why not?
Robert: Well, for one thing, I work all day and couldn’t take
care of you.
A.D.: What about Joan [my wife]?
Robert: She works too.
A.D.: Oh. . . . When are you going to retire?
Robert: Not for a while. But even when I do, I don’t think I
could take care of you as well as they do at New
Hope. Don’t you like it there?
A.D.: It’s alright. But I miss you.
Robert: I miss you too.
A.D.: I wish you lived closer.
Robert: I do too. But we do talk a lot and I come up to visit
you pretty often.
A.D.: I know.30
Probably the most difficult thing I have had to do since
becoming my sister’s guardian—though, again, the difficulty
had little to do with my being her guardian and more about
being her older brother—was to talk to my sister about our
parents’ deaths, especially our mother’s. Death is a difficult
concept for people of typical intelligence to understand and
accept; for a person with an intellectual disability, the abstract
concept of death can be especially ineffable.
Although my sister in time came to accept our mother’s
death, at first she could not understand why she had died.  Our
mother, who was 89, had a massive heart attack on a Friday
evening and died the following Monday.  The suddenness of
her death was difficult for my sister to understand. She would
ask me why everyone had to die. I told her everyone had not
died. She then said, “Milton Berle died. Jack Benny died.
George Burns died.”  She was channeling all of the cultural fig-
ures of her childhood, a childhood she spent with our mother
watching these iconic entertainers. 
How should I respond? She was, of course, correct that
these comedians had died31 but I wanted to reassure her that
others’ deaths were not imminent.  I told her, “These men died
a long time ago.  They were very old. No one close to you is
going to die soon.”  She asked, “Why do people have to die?”
I said death is a part of life, and that everyone who is born will
die. She asked, “Are you going to die?” I said, “I don’t plan to
die any time soon.” After one of these conversations, when she
was dealing much better with our mother’s death, she declared,
“Well, I don’t want to die. I am not going to die.”  I told her, “If
you don’t die, you will be the only person ever born who did-
n’t die.” At that, she laughed, recognizing perhaps that her
desire for eternal life might not be possible to satisfy.
My father was still alive at the time of my mother’s death,
but his dementia had progressed to the point that he did not
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32. Before he lost all awareness, my wife and I went to visit him at his
assisted living facility. He spoke to me for a while and seemed to
recognize me. He started talking about my sister, and somehow
had concluded that she was a wonderful person because “she did
such good work with handicapped people.” My wife said, “Your
son is pretty wonderful, too.” My father looked at her quizzically
and said, “I don’t know him very well.” I told my sister this story
and she was tickled that my father remembered her (however
imperfectly) and not me.
33. From time to time, my sister has told me that she talks to our
mother before she goes to bed. She will ask me if it is alright to do
that. After I suggest that she do it before going to bed, and that it’s
a private matter that she should probably not do when others are
around, she seems satisfied.  But sometimes, to confirm that it is
acceptable behavior, she will ask me again if it is OK to speak with
our mother. I tell her that as long as Mom doesn’t answer, it’s fine.
She laughs.
34. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 21-2047(a): “[A] general or limited
guardian shall: . . . (7) Include the ward in decision-making
process to the maximum extent of the ward’s ability; and (8)
Encourage the ward to act on his or her own behalf whenever he
or she is able to do so, and to develop or regain capacity to make
decisions in those areas in which he or she is in need of decision-
making assistance, to the maximum extent possible.”; D.C. CODE
21-2047(b): “A general or limited guardian may: . . . (6) If rea-
sonable under all of the circumstances, delegate to the ward cer-
tain responsibilities for decisions affecting the ward’s well-being.” 
35. For a criticism of both the substituted-judgment and best-interest
standards, see Linda S. Whitton & Laurence A. Frolik, Surrogate
Decision-Making Standards for Guardians: Theory and Reality, 2012
UTAH L. REV. 1491.
recognize anyone.32 It seemed cruel to tell him that his wife of
60 years had died, even if he could have understood the infor-
mation, and I declined to do so. My sister, who always thought
of my parents as a twosome, could not comprehend how he
could not know she had died.
But if my sister had trouble at first accepting our mother’s
death, she was from the first in touch with the emotional side
of her loss and mine. She would talk about missing our
mother,33 and, after our father died nine months later, missing
him as well.  She particularly missed telling them what she had
done each day, and transferred that reporting function to her
conversations with me.  I told her that I also missed them, and
missed telling them about important things in my life as well.
I found that talking with her about my parents’ deaths allowed
me to be in touch with my own emotions.  
And that leads me to my final conclusion about the rela-
tionship between guardian and person under guardianship.
The relationship need not be a one-way street from guardian to
the person under guardianship. The guardian can learn from
the person under guardianship as well. I have learned a lot
about people with intellectual disabilities from my sister, even
as I recognize that she does not represent all such people. I also
have learned about the complexities of decision making and
how challenging it can be to determine what a person’s authen-
tic interests and desires are. At its best, we might treat the
guardianship relationship less as a top-down relationship and
more as a form of partnership. 
SOME LESSONS FOR GUARDIANSHIP
Though it might be a bit presumptuous, I believe the above
stories can provide some valuable lessons for judges who pre-
side over guardianships.
1. More care should be taken at the time of appointment
of the guardian to clarify the guardian’s role
Even though I knew a lot about guardianship before apply-
ing to be my sister’s guardian, including abuses, neglect, and
conflicts of interest that can exist in the relationship, I was
struck by how little information is communicated to prospec-
tive guardians about what is involved in becoming a guardian
and how one should behave in the role. While the court may
assume that the petitioner’s attorney will explain the duties of
the guardian, in my experience
lawyers do not always perform
this function well. Lawyers
can be expected to explain to
their clients whether they have
to make reports to the court
and how often they need to do
so. But it is less clear that they
spend sufficient time dis-
cussing how the guardian
should make decisions for (or
with) the person under
guardianship.  Many statutes
require the guardian to give
the person under guardianship as much independence as pos-
sible.34 I think too many guardians believe that the person
under guardianship is to be protected in all respects, which is
inconsistent with supporting the person’s autonomy to the
maximum extent feasible.
2. The standard of decision making guardians use 
needs to be more nuanced than substituted judgment
or best interest
As some of the above examples reflect, determining the
appropriate standard of decision making the guardian should
use is no easy matter. The substituted-judgment standard is a
useful corrective to the best-interest standard, which can be
overly paternalistic, or the decision that the guardian would
make for himself or herself.  But taken literally, the substituted-
judgment standard could lead a guardian to make unrealistic
or unwise decisions, or to make decisions that, while con-
forming to the wishes of the person, do not take into account
the constraints that all decision makers face.35
I don’t have a convenient name for the decision-making
standard I have tried to use with my sister, but it is a mix of
shared decision making and supported decision making.
Although as a formal matter I have made certain decisions for
her—such as authorizing certain medical treatments or med-
ications—I have done so only after consultation with her.  On
many matters, she has made decisions on her own, without
consulting me.  On others, I have executed a decision of hers
for which she has sought validation and reinforcement.
I don’t have a
name for the 
decision-making
standard I have
tried to use with
my sister, but it is
a mix of shared 
. . . and supported
decision making.
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36. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 21-2047 (a): “[A] general or limited
guardian shall: (1) Become or remain personally acquainted with
the ward and maintain sufficient contact with the ward to know
of the ward’s capacities, limitations, needs, opportunities, and
physical and mental health[.]”
37. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 21-2011(11), which defines an incapaci-
tated individual as “an adult whose ability to receive and evaluate
information effectively or to communicate decisions is impaired
to such an extent that he or she lacks the capacity to manage all
or some of his or her financial resources or to meet all or some
essential requirements for his or her physical health, safety, habil-
itation, or therapeutic needs without court-ordered assistance or
the appointment of a guardian or conservator.”
38. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 21-2044(c), which authorizes a court to
appoint a limited guardian in lieu of a general guardian. Section
21-2044 (a) requires the court to exercise its authority “so as to
encourage the development of maximum self-reliance and inde-
pendence of the incapacitated individual” and to order the type of
guardianship that is least restrictive of the incapacitated individ-
ual in scope and duration. 
39. See Lawrence A. Frolik, Promoting Judicial Acceptance and Use of
Limited Guardianship, 31 STETSON L. REV. 735, 741 (2002).
40. In August 2017, the American Bar Association House of Delegates
is expected to consider a resolution urging it to recognize that,
consistent with the principle of the least-restrictive alternative,
courts should not order guardianships without first considering
supported decision-making arrangements. The resolution is being
proposed by the ABA Commission on Disability Rights, Section of
Civil Rights and Social Justice, Section of Real Property, Trust and
Estate Law, and the Commission on Law and Aging. I have been
working with an ad hoc group of academics and practitioners in
drafting the resolution and an accompanying report. 
41. See sources cited in note 16, supra.
Guardianship statutes require a
guardian to know the person for
whom he or she is making deci-
sions,36 but even with my having
a lifetime of experience with her,
my sister continues to surprise
me. Many family members serve
as guardians for love not money.
But good intentions are insuffi-
cient, and guardians need con-
stantly to be aware of their
proper role and be prepared to
provide the right level of support
for the person they are serving. 
3. Not all guardianships are the same—even for people
who have the same diagnosis
Guardianship is not a one-size-fits-all proposition. Even
within the same category of guardianship—e.g., guardianship
for a person with an intellectual disability—there are signifi-
cant differences between being a parent guardian versus a sib-
ling guardian, being a guardian over a person living with the
guardian versus being one for someone living hours away, and
being a guardian for a person who is verbal and communica-
tive versus being a guardian for one who is not.  As I noted ear-
lier, I could not begin to control many aspects of my sister’s life
even if I wanted to because she lives far away from me. I would
hope I would support her autonomy and self-determination to
a similar extent even if she lived close by and I had the capac-
ity to intervene in her life more.  
The standard for imposing guardianship, roughly that the
person lacks capacity to manage her affairs,37 is vague enough
that people with quite different abilities can come within its
purview. Many statutes have provisions for limited guardian-
ships,38 but commentators have noted the significant under-
usage of this less-restrictive alternative to general or plenary
guardianship.39 Even the imposition of a limited guardianship
should be subjected to the least-restrictive-alternative princi-
ple, and a court should not order it if arrangements short of
guardianship, such as supported decision making, are avail-
able.40
Ironically, the statute under which I was appointed guardian
for my sister, a person with a developmental disability, does
not provide for limited guardianship, unlike the more general
New York statute, Article 81.41 Insofar as my guardianship in
fact functions as a limited guardianship, in that my sister
makes many of her own decisions, it is not because the statute
requires it but because I choose to define my powers more nar-
rowly than the law would permit. Enhancing the autonomy of
the person under guardianship should not be left to the whim
of the guardian. 
4. Nothing is—or should be—forever, including 
guardianship
Guardianship is a powerful decision-making tool, one that
may be more powerful than needed.  But even if the order
appointing a guardian is valid at the time of initial entry, cir-
cumstances can change, especially for people under guardian-
ship not suffering from dementia. While nothing prevents a
guardian from assisting the person under guardianship in seek-
ing restoration of some or all of that person’s decision-making
rights, meaningful court-supervised periodic review would
provide needed oversight over the process.  A more thorough-
going reform would provide a time limitation on guardianships
(perhaps with an exception for those people with dementia) so
that the burden of persuasion was on the guardian to demon-
strate that guardianship in its then current form continued to
be needed. 
CONCLUSION
Every parent of a child with an intellectual disability wor-
ries about what will happen to the child when the parent is no
longer around. When the child has a sibling, there is at least
the possibility that the sibling will step up and continue to be
a presence in the life of the person with a disability.  I have met
many siblings who have accepted this responsibility willingly
and without question. In becoming my sister’s guardian, I have
sought to carry out this responsibility faithfully and to do so in
a way that recognizes my sister’s individuality and desire to live
her own life in her own way. 
An intellectual disability is not a tragedy. People with intel-
lectual disabilities, such as my sister, can bring great joy into
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the life of their families and generate laughter far more often
than sorrow.  I don’t know that my involvement in my sister’s
life would be much different if I were not her guardian, but
since the roles of brother and guardian are inevitably inter-
twined, I embrace my dual roles in all of their contradictions
and complexity. 
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Across
1 Milan opera house, with “La”
6 The ___ Radio Hour
10 Crow call
13 Divvy up
14 Sandwichy cookie
15 “To a Mouse,” e.g.
16 Snacks for the dig-set-spike
crowd? (2 courts)
19 Stuntman Knievel
20 Cottonseed product
21 Disruptive noise
22 Got an ___ (saw a lot)
24 Barnyard scratcher
25 Actor Waterston
28 Part of DJIA
29 Arlo, to Woody
30 Plant used to make poi
31 1960s justice Fortas
34 Main thrusts
36 Merchandizing events
37 Gourd veggie for the shuttlecock
crowd? (2 courts)
40 Insurance investigator’s concern
41 American statesman Root
42 Bambi’s mother, for example
43 Shoe insert
44 “What did I tell you?”
45 Fink (on)
47 “Electric” fish
48 Hone of the Braves, briefly
49 “... ___ more than he could chew”
52 Hit the wrong button, say
53 Brooks who has won an Oscar,
Emmy, Grammy and Tony
SOME SERIOUS COURTING by Judge Victor Fleming
53 Degs. held by Romney and Bush
55 “Coal Miner’s Daughter” singer
Loretta
56 Clean tables
57 Put a question to
58 Crumpets go-with
59 Weigh-in abbr.
54 Collection of shops
56 Moldable mud for the hoops
crowd? (2 courts)
60 “___ Today”
61 Scorch on a grill
62 Yacht club site
63 Make use of snowy slopes
64 Answer with attitude
65 Rudder’s place
Down
1 Not squander
2 Garlic piece
3 See 46-Down
4 Dangled
5 Partook of
6 It merged with Exxon
7 Dentist’s kind of surgery
8 ___ Aviv
9 William of “Stalag 17” and
“Network”
10 Ring-tailed critter
11 ___ Annie (“Oklahoma!”
character)
12 Hitched
17 “I concede”
18 Five-dollar bill, in slang
23 Surround a with dense mist
24 Egypt’s Mubarak
25 Healthy lunch choice
26 Comeback to “Am not!”
27 Dayan or Arens
29 Ripped off
30 Fraternity letter
31 Taper off
32 Ballerina’s support
33 The “Ishtar” of cars
35 Superman’s makeup?
36 Diddly-___
38 Cohort of Curly and Larry
39 Unpleasantly penetrating
44 Accentuate
46 3-Down feline
48 Genesis vessel
49 Market pessimists
50 “... bear ___ witness against ...”
51 Natural ability
52 Morales of “The Burning Season”
Vic Fleming is a district judge in 
Little Rock, Arkansas. 
Answers are found on page 72.
(continued from page 52)
CONCLUSION
As can be seen, the principled approach to the admissibility
of hearsay evidence, as formulated by the Supreme Court of
Canada, allows for the introduction of hearsay evidence in a
potentially broad context. The recent decision of the Ontario
Court of Appeal in Khan, in which reference was made to nar-
rative evidence as circumstantial evidence, illustrates this
point.  However, the same Court’s decision in Zou illustrates
that despite the Supreme Court of Canada’s willingness to
allow for prior consistent statements to be admitted; great cau-
tion in their use is still warranted. 
Wayne Gorman is a judge of the Provincial
Court of Newfoundland and Labrador. His
blog (Keeping Up Is Hard to Do: A Trial
Judge’s Reading Blog) can be found on the web
page of the Canadian Association of Provincial
Court Judges. He also writes a regular col-
umn (Of Particular Interest to Provincial
Court Judges) for the Canadian Provincial
Judges’ Journal. Judge Gorman’s work has been widely pub-
lished. Comments or suggestions to Judge Gorman may be sent to 
wgorman@provincial.court.nl.ca. 
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A
NEW PUBLICATIONS
ENHANCING JUSTICE: REDUCING BIAS (Sarah
E. Redfield, ed.). American Bar Ass’n,
2017. 400 pp. ($79.95).
https://goo.gl/WTxW7X 
The American Bar Association has pub-
lished a new book on the intersection of
implicit bias and the justice system. It’s a
multi-author effort, with different authors
for each of 15 chapters. 
Several of the chapters are by nationally
recognized scholars who have provided an
up-to-date summary of the latest research
on implicit bias as it relates to the court
system. For example:
• Professors Justin D. Levinson, Danielle
M. Young, and Laurie A. Rudman take
on what is perhaps the book’s biggest
lift—an overview of the social science
about implicit bias. They explain
research suggesting that when implicit
stereotypes are activated in the human
mind, we are prone to making critical
mistakes. They also provide detailed
examples and evidence showing how
implicit bias leads to a variety of dis-
criminatory outcomes, including legal
ones.
• Professor Jeffrey J. Rachlinski and U.S.
District Magistrate Judge Andrew
Wistrich take on a more focused look at
how implicit bias affects judicial deci-
sion making. Along with Vanderbilt
Law Dean Chris Guthrie (and some-
times additional researchers), Rachlin-
ski and Wistrich have been studying
what can lead to cognitive errors among
judges for more than a decade. In their
chapter, they bring together the research
about how implicit bias affects judges;
they also discuss practical steps judges
can take to reduce the risk that implicit
bias may taint judicial decisions.
In addition, several judges explore
these issues from a judicial perspective:
U.S. District Judge Mark W. Bennett, a
thought leader on the federal bench, talks
about a number of innovative approaches
he has tried in his courtroom to overcome
implicit bias. He also discusses how he has
seen evidence of bias in his more than two
decades on the federal bench.
Cook County (Illinois) Circuit Judge
Sophia H. Hall, a state-court judge with
more than three decades on the bench,
provides suggestions for judicial leader-
ship aimed at combatting implicit bias.
She gives specific suggestions for manag-
ing meetings with diverse participants to
discuss these hot-button topics.
Kansas Court of Appeals Chief Judge
Karen Arnold-Burger, consultant Jean
Mavrelis and attorney Phyllis B. Pickett
discuss opportunities for community out-
reach that would open dialog between
judges and community members about
perceptions of justice. They also suggest
training approaches that would make
implicit-bias training for judges and court
staff more effective.
Judge Bernice Donald of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and Pro-
fessor Sarah Redfield, the book’s editor,
frame the book’s other chapters with an
early chapter defining and providing an
overview of basic concepts, including
implicit bias, “ingroup” and “outgroup”
responses, and “micromessaging.” They
also explain their own personal journeys
of discovery about implicit bias.
The book also includes an overview of
procedural fairness (also known as proce-
dural justice) written by former American
Judges Association presidents Kevin Burke
and Steve Leben. Burke and Leben suggest
that adherence to procedural-fairness
principles may help to lessen the effects of
implicit bias in the courtroom.
Most of the book’s chapters also pro-
vide places a reader may go to learn more
about the topic.
PAMELA CASEY, JENNIFER ELEK & ROGER WAR-
REN, AN EVIDENCE-BASED APPROACH TO PRO-
MOTING & ENFORCING COMPLIANCE WITH
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION & SUPERVISION.
National Center for State Courts, Center for
Sentencing Initiatives, 2017. 5 pp.
https://goo.gl/41z3Mh 
The National Center for State Courts’
Center for Sentencing Initiatives periodi-
cally issues short reports—aimed at the
judicial audience—on key questions
involved in criminal sentencing. These
reports are highly readable and contain
conclusions that are backed up by exten-
sive research that’s cited in footnotes (usu-
ally with links where the underlying
reports can be found on the Internet). 
The latest report covers how to best set
up probation terms and supervision to
gain offender success on probation. The
brief report gives research-based answers
to eight key questions:
• What are the overall goals of effective
probation supervision?
• What works to promote compliance
with the terms and conditions of proba-
tion?
• What works in sanctioning violations?
• What are administrative sanctions?
• Is the availability of risk-and-needs-
assessment (RNA) information helpful
in responding to violation?
• How do probation agencies ensure that
the system of rewards and sanctions is
administered with consistency, trans-
parency, and fairness?
• What are the specific factors that should
be considered in determining an appro-
priate response to a violation in an indi-
vidual case?
• When is revocation an appropriate
response to a violation?
If these questions seem relevant to your
daily work—and you’d like to read some
research-based answers—head over to the
Internet link listed above to take a look at
the report. The Center for Sentencing Ini-
tiatives is funded in part by The Pew Char-
itable Trusts.
The Resource Page
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